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Resistance and the Possibility of Freedom: 
Foucault, Merleau-Ponty and Subjectivity in Tension 
Joshua Ziady 
Honors Thesis 
Dept. of Politics 
Oberlin College 
April 30, 1993 
A. Introduction 
Charles Taylor chose to begin his 1984 critique of Michel Foucault with the phrase 
"Foucault disconcerts." This seems to be a most appropriate choice of words. Reading Foucault 
changes the way one looks at things. His work, both in style and content, subtly erodes assurances 
and certainties, leaving one with the feeling of standing at the edge of a cliff in complete darkness 
with the knowledge that there is something out there without being able to grasp that something--
yet without fear of falling off the cliff. The reader is left with an unexplainable gap in 
understanding where before there was explanation, meaning, even truth; a feeling that there is 
something missing or something left unsaid.Yet his writing is powerful, sometimes literary or 
even beautiful. It is at points coldly empirical and descriptive, then speculative; unsettling 
conclusions drawn from the weight of 'fact'. Foucault's pen pokes at the nerve endings of his 
readers while explaining to them, in no uncertain terms, why it is that they hurt For these reasons- • 
-for the combination of brightly illuminating explanation and gray areas of confusion--Foucault 
seemed like a good place to start my inquiry into freedom. 
However, it turns out that this essay is not really about Foucault, although it is concerned. 
with his work. It originated in an attempt to come to grips with two related phenomena: (1) the 
political implications of Foucault's theory of power/knowledge, as explicated in various short 
articles and in Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, his study of the development of the 
modern system of punishment and normalization; and (2) that brand of philosophy or social theory 
which rallies under the banner of the 'post-modem'. From there, it meandered and waffled until a 
chance encounter with the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty led me (more or less) to 
abandon my ill defined quest for a 'post-modern' theory of freedom and critique of previous theory 
in favor of a modified post-modernism, if it can even be called that: modified by Merleau-Ponty's 
existentialism of the lived body; and modified by the conviction that Foucault alone could not 
provide the groundwork for understanding freedom in a manner compatible with his own theory of 
power, regardless of his own intentions and despite what I saw as the obvious importance of his 
work to any theorizing about the possible nature(s) of freedom. This essay now stands as an 
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attempt to approach the problem of freedom through an investigation into the possibility of 
resistance. To do so, I will follow the dual leads of Merleau-Ponty's post-Cartesian existentialism 
and Foucault's conclusions about the manifestation of power in modem society through the 
disciplining of body and mind. In looking at the points at which Merleau-Ponty and Foucault meet, 
where one provides insight into the ideas of the other, and the points at which they diverge, I hope 
to be able to sketch the outline of a theory of freedom, or a way of thinking about the problem of 
freedom, that is attentive to the themes of both thinkers but not necessarily restricted by their 
conclusions. 
B. The question of freedom; Or, why I am bothering with this 
Freedom is an idea with a lot of attached baggage, especially in the United States. The 
category of freedom, as a concept governing the day to day understanding people have of their 
lives, has become attached to various modes of action or living. For example, the idea of a 'free 
society' comprised of free individuals, who make free choices and think freely, or the 'freedom' of 
market exchange. To a certain extent freedom has become, at least in the social, political and 
cultural milieu of the United States, the definitive category of our political culture. We, as citizens 
of a Western capitalist State, are 'free' due to oU,:.apparent democracy, our chances at the 
'American dream,' our ability to enter into 'free' agreements in the market, etc. Our freedom as 
individuals, our agency or ability to choose, is bound up with the larger categories of State, Capital 
and culture. Freedom is in a sense a symbol of 'our' way of life and thus has inevitably become a 
symbol of 'our' wish to extend that way of life beyond the physical boundaries of the United 
States. Or so it seems. 
This analysis must not be taken as a definitive description of the status of freedom in the 
United States. Rather, it should be understood as a general picture, a description of the 'state' of 
freedom. Furthermore, this 'state' of freedom as an idea and a practice is a surf ace phenomenon: 
the result of the necessary functioning of the State and of those whose position--or whose 'power' -
-is invested in the idea of freedom retaining precisely the meaning it seems to have now. Each 
individual, I would argue, understands his or her freedom ( or lack thereof) in a different way. 
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However, the general notion of freedom to which individuals and groups compare their own status 
as free beings, at least in the United States, is organized within specific boundaries. These 
boundaries are historical, and they are not innocuous: freedom, as it is understood and acted upon, 
is operative within a certain political context and works to further the perpetuation of that context. 
For example, the necessary functioning of a democratic State requires, I would argue, that the 
citizens of that State understand their freedom, which at once binds them to the State and thus 
legitimizes the State, in a particular manner. We are free, of course, because we can vote for our 
leaders and, if we work hard, we can buy a new car every year. We have our rights, and these 
rights are protected by the State or infringed upon by the State. What could be simpler than that? 
This argument reflects the work of Marx. Marx argued that the idea of freedom which 
characterized the capitalist societies of his time was ideological in that it masked the relationships of 
domination which organized human interaction in the economic realm. Thus freedom and right in a 
capitalist democracy, he argued, was the freedom and tight to be a wage-slave. To truly be free one 
must abandon bourgeois politics as a means of emancipation, and revolutionize the very structures 
of society which have created the domination masked by ideology. Marx's critique is still operative 
today, although in a different form. That is, I would argue that our freedom is still in a sense 
'ideological' in that it obscures relations of domination. These relations, however, are more 
complex, in a sense, than the brute force which characterized the relationship between capitalist and -
worker in the 19th century. It is at this point that Foucault enters the picture. 
I would argue that two concurrent and divergent phenomena or movements are operative in 
the United States, one in the sphere of ROlitics and the other in the sphere of P.,,hilos~phy, which are 
bound up in the way we understand or can potentially understand the idea of freedom. In the - --, 
former, the idea of 'freedom' is employed in political action and political rhetoric as a concept with 
definitive and un~ able meaning, related to the idea of freedom in the liberal tradition. This 
tradition argues, in general, that freedom rests in the atomized and universalized individual with --------·· ~--. 
certain inherent rights and capabilities. The individual's freedom, therefore, is defined in terms of 
individuals capability of exercising that freedom (for example, in choice, freedom of expression, 
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etc.) in relation to large coercive institutions or networks of institutions, both political and 
economic. In the context of 'our' political system 'freedom' is given specific forms and meaning 
(e.g., in the form of laws which determine the character of the relationship between the State and 
the individual) and thus has specific results for individuals and groups. This situation is 
particularly characteristic of the United States in that politics in this country have been shaped 
without significant contribution from oppositional modes of political activity, such as a large and 
visible Marxist party, which might have contributed to a wider understanding or application of the 
idea of freedom. 
In the latter movement, which includes the work of Foucault, the advent of postmodern or 
poststructuralist ways of thought has undermined the philosophical underpinnings of previous 
notions of freedom, thus creating a theoretical inadequacy; and inability to talk about freedom using 
the categories and terms which still organize the meaning of freedom as it is manifested in the 
sphere of political action and rhetoric. I will argue, following Foucault, that the idea of reasonable, 
autonomous, equal individuals contracting and negotiating relationships with large coercive 
institutions and with each other in order to ensure certain rights (self expression, cultural 
expression, etc.) has been fundamentally eroded theoretically. However, States and individuals--
and this is where the argument has certain affinities with a Marxist notion of ideology--act as if 
freedom thus understood retained universal validity. The concept of freedom, therefore, seemingly 
rests on a philosophical black hole while simultaneously it retains great importance in a political 
context--for example, 'freedom' as a source of legitimation for the political regime or State action 
in the name of freedom--without significant transformation of meaning or practical application. 
Freedom remains a category defined and acted upon in the United States by the very terms and 
categories undermined, ostensibly, by post-modern thought. 
However, this essay is not an attempt to come to grips with 'postmodernity' as a 
phenomenon of philosophy or an actual historical era. The above discussion, I hope, has shown 
the divergence between (a) the category of freedom as it has come to be expressed in an active 




State--and conditions the self-understanding of individuals living in a specific political regime, and 
(b) the theoretical understanding of human existence which has developed over the last couple of 
decades (of which freedom is a part, at least in the sense that it has been historically a highly 
charged category, both philosophically and practically). The point is this: not everything is clear 
on the Western front, or any front for that matter. The possibility, which Marx recognized and 
which must be recognized again today, that both the actions of the State and individual self-
understanding in relation to freedom are based on concepts which are in some way illusory 
indicates not only a fundamental problem with how we understand freedom, but a fundamental 
problem with the state of our politics. In short: "freedom" in the form it takes in our political 
culture and practice is an unfreedom.1 
This argument should be modified by two conditions. First, the post-modernism of 
Foucault undermines traditional ways of thinking about freedom while at the same time offering up 
some new concepts, different ways of thinking about power, which must be taken into 
consideration in a discussion of freedom. Second, other movements of thought in various 
relationships to post-modernism also offer insights which must be considered while discussing 
freedom: feminism and other currents of thought emphasizing the necessity of incorporating -
difference or alterity into political theory serve as a good example of this tendency. An additional 
potential source of criticism and insight, and one which will be utilized in this essay, can be found 
in existential phenomenology. Specifically, I will employ the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 
which stands in a somewhat ambiguous relationship to post-modem thought (and to Foucault--
despite his denials of the validity of existentialist or phenomenological thought). p t I will do and argue 
1 I am not arguing that the relationship between the State and the individual, for example, is 
meaningless in relation to the idea or practice of freedom. Rather, it is the case that this understanding 
of freedom, while it is not necessarily 'wrong', leads politics not in the direction of freedom, but of 
unfreedom. That is, politics which understands freedom in the way it seems to be currently understood 
leads to a neglect of relations, such as those of disciplinary power exposed by Foucault, which affects 
the way we understand our lives and our politics. Foucault, I think, certainly made this point. 
5 
This essay has somewhat of a two stage form. The first and more decisive stage involves a 
discussion of Foucault's theory of power relations and an elaboration of the linkage--and the 
sometimes extreme divergence--between Foucault's work and the existentialism of the lived body 
articulated by Merleau-Ponty. In short, the first stage of the essay . will ask: "How does an 
individual come to resist power, especially to resist something as subtle as disciplinary power, 
something that the individual him/herself is implicated in?" Resistance, in this instance, should be 
understood both as refusal of those norms and conventions which subjugate an individual and an 
attempt to go beyond them. The second stage will ask "Given that individuals resist, and given the 
conclusions reached about the nature of existence and resistance in the discussion of Foucault and 
Merleau-Ponty, what light is shed on the idea of freedom; or, more fundamentally, what kind of a 
sketch of out line of a theory of freedom follows from this discussion?" With these conclusions in 
mind, the next step (stage 2a, maybe) will be a formulation of this political implications of my 
earlier conclusions. This should not be understood as an attempt to provide a definitive answer to 
the question "what is freedom"; rather it is an attempt to approach freedom from a particular 
perspective--an angle, or a view, one which begins with the body (through Merleau-Ponty) and 
with power relations (through Foucault). 
What necessitates this unholy alliance between two seemingly incompatible modes of 
thinking--and two seemingly incompatible pictures of existence? Or, why Merleau-Ponty and 
Foucault? They are divergent and in some ways radically opposed theorists, yet they both off er 
insights into the possible natures of subjectivity, existence and thus freedom. Together, their ideas 
provide a basis for a general sketch of a theory of freedom--a finger pointed in the direction of 
freedom--which understands freedom as a modality or potentiality of existence, neither inherent in 
the nature of the subject (as some, such as Sartre and even Merleau-Ponty, argue) nor denied by 
Foucault's exposure of the power relations which characterize our society (a conclusion some 
argue stems automatically from Foucault's work).2 I hope to be able to propose a way of looking at 
2 The work of Jurgen Habermas, Nancy Hartsock and Charles Taylor all reflect, in some ways, this 
critique of Foucault. 
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freedom which is attentive to both Foucault's theory of power relations and the situational and 
'bodily' view of subjectivity outlined by Merleau-Ponty without denying the limitations of each 
theorist and the possible gaps in understanding which thus arise. I will argue that freedom is 
related to both the potential agency, or project, of the individual and the potentialities outlined py 
the situation in which the individual exists. Following both Foucault and Merleau-Ponty, this --
>( 
situation is constituted by botq history and the individual through the "sedimentation" of individual 
and social/cultural practice (Merleau-Ponty) and the network of things, practices, discourse, views, 
:;,aces, etc. which constitute the disciplinary modality of power (F.QJ!£!_ult). FundamentallyJI 
propose a synthesis of the concepts offered by Merleau-Ponty and Foucault. 
The following is the general tendency of my argument: resistance to power relations--
relations of creative and formative force constituted by the constellation of things, spaces, gazes 
and practices around the physical body of the individual--can be understood as resulting from a 
tension created in the resisting subject. This tension, I will argue, arises through the interaction of 
the body, as a lived body and as a knowing body, with the world understood as a field defined by 
the relations of power. In a sense, the body experiences the world in a manner ~ alogous to the 
e,g?erience of a hostile Other.3 What exactly do I mean by this? I don't mean to imply that the 
world is taken by the body as a hostile consciousness (which would be absurd, since what I am 
trying to describe is an interaction between body world which proceeds reflection). Nor do I mean 
3 There is a tension in this essay centered around the language used to describe the subject/ object of 
freedom. Do I adopt Merleau-Ponty's language of body-subject and lived body, or Foucault's language, in 
which the individual is at once subject and object, but not a subject in the traditional sense (e.g., one that 
is autonomous and universalized)? Both thinkers go beyond the subject/ object and mind/body dualisms 
of previous philosophy, but in different ways and with different intentions. In both Merleau-Ponty and 
Foucault the use of the terms subject and object is confusing, because their meanings overlap, and neither 
thinker argued that a true subject, as a category opposed and separate to a true object, existed, though 
Merleau-Ponty conceived of an essential subjectivity, while Foucault did not. There is also the problem 
of consciousness--and the problem of delineating between speaking of the thetic consciousness and the 
pre-reflective consciousness, both of which are more or less not consciousness in the traditional sense of 
the word. To make things easier, when I say "body" I will be talking about the pre-reflective body-the 
body which jerks away from something hot. In this chapter, when I use "body-subject" I will be talking 
about the thetic or reflective individual-with the notion firmly in mind that these are not two 
separate stages or levels of existence; they exist concurrently and are intertwined into each other, 
although this convention is abandoned in the following chapters. The following two chapters will 
show this tendency in both Merleau-Ponty and Foucault. 
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to re-enforce a fundamental divide between the world and the body or body-subject, thus re-
creating the Cartesian subject-object distinction. Rather, the body 'experiences' the world--
constituted by a field of objects, spaces, gazes, and practices which define a regime of power 
relations--as conflictual and confusing. The meeting or contact of the body and a world whose 
configuration is implicated in the organization of a particular regime of power relations is 
primordial, pre-reflective; thus it can be understocxi to be linked Merleau-Ponty's tacit cogito, the 
pre-thetic contact of the being of the world with the being of the body, and thus the being of the 
body-subject.4 Rather than a pitched battle, the relationship I am attempting to describe can be 
understood as an infraction, an invisible burr beneath our subjective saddles, and one that soothes 
while it subtly works; most importantly, one that is not (potentially) lost to the body or the booy-
subject This needs clarification as well. 
For Merleau-Ponty the relationship between the body and the world is the midwife of all A. 
thought, of all "cultural expression," of all knowledge. We live our lives, according to Merleau-
Ponty, temporally as a network of intentionalities and existentially as a field of presence--with our 
_ body as the original node of that manner of being in (and even of) the world. He argues that our 
body's perceptual and motile capabilities are linked (as part of a system incorporating the project of 
the individual, history, culture and the existence of others) through the body's pre-thetic encounter 
with the world to our "style" of existence--and fundamentally to how we understand the world. 
Following Foucault, as a result of the interaction between our bodies and the methods and 
techniques of discipline, our minds and bodies are conformed to a "style" dictated from the 
outside, thus masking the original relationship. Through combining Merleau-Ponty's 
4 There is debate among those who study Merleau-Ponty as to the continuity or lack thereof between his 
Phenomenology of Perception and his later, unfinished world, The Visible and the Invisible. I mention 
this here for the reason that in his later work he began to adopt a new language to describe the 
relationship he perceived between body and world--he saw the body and world as "intertwined" and 
part of the primordial "element" of being, the flesh. Thus I use the word ,.intertwined" with caution, 
but use it nonetheless, because I think, following M.C. Dillon, that the seeming discontinuity between 
early and later work was not so much a function of content of Merleau-Ponty's theory, but of the 
language used in the phenomenological tradition. Additionally, his language in the Visible and the 
Invisible is more conducive to the style and argument of this essay, though the Phenomenology is the 
primary source. 
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understanding of bodily existence with that of Foucault, who sees the body as the point of 
application of power, I will attempt to create a framework which understands our manner of being 
in the world, and the knowledges of self and others which comprise part of that manner of being, 
as being put into tension by the body's pre-reflective encounter with the field of objects, spaces, 
gazes, etc. that comprise the mechanism which create relationships of power. By doing this, I 
hope to approach my original intention: an answer to the question "why resist power" that allows 
for a discussion of freedom that incorporates the insights he provides. 
Foucault claims that power creates: it creates norms, it creates individuals, it creates useful 
bodies and it creates the objects investigated by science. The creative mechanism of power begins 
with the physical orientation of space around the body and the practices and movements which 
orient the body into that space, thus creating a possible object of discursive knowledge/subject of 
power. Power relations, in part, arise through tangible experience: there is a physical reality as well 
as a mental or reflective process operative here; in fact, the physicality of the mechanisms of power 
and the effect of these relations on categories traditionally thought of as being in the realm of the 
mind (knowledge, understanding, etc.) are intimately linked and mutually re-enforcing. That is, 
there exists a distinct physical and bodily modality (through the network of things, spaces, 
practices and methods which constitute a particular disciplinary mechanism) in the organization and 
subsequent manifestation of power relations. This modality is experienced by the body and affects 
the body, creating a body useful, for example, in war or production and a body that can be 
understood, ranked, categorized, and classified. Power relations are, however, manifested as 
phenomena of consciousness, of thought and reflection. Or, to more accurately represent 
Foucault's position, the creation of the 'consciousness' and thus the individual is dependent upon 
the body's insertion into a specific world, constituted by a particular constellation of disciplinary 
mechanisms. 
The body encounters and re-encounters some modality of 'discipline' at every junction of 
existence, thus allowing for power relations to manifest themselves in knowledge projects and in 
the lives, and self-understanding, of individual subjects. In this essay I will follow Merleau-
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Ponty's analysis of temporality, the organization of space around the body-subject and his 
conclusions regarding the link between tacit cogito and knowledge, self-understanding, and the 
body-subject's style of existence in the world in order to attempt to explain the possibility of a 
tensional subjectivity and thus the possibility of resistance. With this in mind, but without 
elaborating his positions here, it seems that th@._very stuff of subjectivicy, as Merleau-Ponty sees it--
existence as a project of the individual in space and time, a project of physical and temporal 
movement organized around the body-;becomes ~r confused when his ontology is 
extended by a Foucaultian analysis of power. 'Subjectivity' should be understood here as existence -------in a lived body in perpetual contact with the world, which contains no universals other than the 
capacity of perceptual synthesis, movement, etc. 
I have chosen to describe the interaction between the body and the world, as a system of 
disciplinary mechanisms and related knowledge projects and power relations, as "an experience, 
by the body, of the world as Other" more or less for a lack of a better vocabulary. Again, the body 
does not experience the world as a hostile consciousness (or any sort of consciousness). Rather the 
body relates to the world as an active physical/practical being (or Being) which, due to the world's 
implication in the organization of power relations, actively interferes with the body's subjective-
like ( or maybe 'knowing') character understood as bodily potentiality and not as consciousness or 
Ego. 'Power relations' are of the world, in the existential usage of the word 'world'. However, 
these relations are intimately connected with the discourses of the human sciences, as Foucault 
calls them, and individual self-understanding. As he sees it, power relations form a field. What I 
am attempting to describe here is possible role of a knowing body in the creation of that field: the 
role of the body, specifically, in the series of complex relationships and interactions--relationships 
which, in addition to the body, involve others, objects, practices, systems of knowledge, etc.--that 
give rise to specific regimes of power relations. 
The body does not resist, but it is the body's role, I will argue, that allows resistance to 
becom~__P-arLof--reflective existence. The body-subject's existence, therefore, at the origin of the 
axes of body, world and power relations contains the possibilities of both resistance and 
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complicity. Does it seem that I have run aground here? Simply by framing my discussion in these 
terms I have created, it seems, three separate entities: body, world and power relations, which 
converge on each other to produce a thinking, existing subject. It must be understood, however, 
that the three axes I describe in some ways overlap; they are more analogous to planes, or three 
dimensional forms which run through each other--somewhere in (or above?) this overlapping 
configuration of things and forces there is a subject. Power relations, following Foucault, stem 
from the world as an arrangement of things and practices; they exist in the body; and they exist in 
the mind. The world and the body, subject and object, and mind and body in Merleau-Ponty are 
not clear cut entities--we are of the world and world is of us. There are no sharp distinctions to be 
made here--body, world and power relations all are related, interacting, connected and sometimes 
opposed. This amorphous blob of a conceptual framework is what I want to somehow link, 
partially, with pre-reflective existence, and thus with Merleau-Ponty's tacit cogito.· 
According to Merleau-Ponty, the tacit cogito reveals the world to the body and the body to 
the world as experienced before the advent of reflection--"in the threat of death or gaze of another" 
(PP, p. 404). The inherence/intertwining of the world's being with the being of the body-subject 
reveals, I will argue, the impressions of power, the traces of the world's physical impact--the 
metaphorical and real marks of the work of power. And thus, I hope, the potential of 
understanding and resistance (with these categories understocxl as being bound up together, as a 
coupled experience). However, due to the ambiguous nature of existence revealed (again) by 
Merleau-Ponty, what is achieved is not really an understanding, but a possibility or a tension; a 
potential state of self-contact or self knowledge (or a state of being) akin to suspicion or unease. 
This tension is linked to the pre-reflective relationship between the body, as a knowing body, and 
the body's physical interaction with a 'world' whose configuration is that of a series or network (a 
field) of relationships which ultimately manifest themselves in the reflective life of the subject as 
relations of power. Thus, the body is linked to the possibility of resistance; resistance depends on 
the body's striving toward the world. This, I think, needs elaboration: (1) in the form of an 
analogy, a way of looking at the framework of understanding which I have drawn and will 
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continue to draw further from the work of Foucault and Merleau-Ponty; and (2) in the form of an 
explanation of what I mean by 'suspicious' being and confused bodies. 
Power relations, as we will see in the following chapter, are manifested as the results a 
specific original relationship between the body and the world as a field, a system, or a network of 
relationships. I will argue that the body, in encountering these relationships and techniques which 
attempt to conform it, 'bumps' up against the world, rather than adhering to it. The original 
'feeling' is one of conflict, which is gradually abetted by the result of the conflict: the reflective 
experience of the relations of power which frame our world. 5 This can be seen as analogous to an 
individual becoming accustomed to a task, such as learning to ride a bike or play an instrument. At 
first the experience is awkward (or conflictual) as the body and the body-subject attempts to 
conform to the rigors of the exercise, but gradually she or he becomes accustomed to the practice--
subject to it--and able to perform that task without, so to speak, 'thinking about it.' If a body-
subject departs from the task for a reasonable amount of time, upon returning she or he is able to 
slide more easily into the routine, because the body retains the impression of the task. In the case 
of learning a task or exercise, however, the experience is one of a conscious relationship between 
the body and the reflective world of the body-subject. Two factors separate this analogy from the 
experience of the mechanisms of discipline: the lack of conscious understanding--not of the 
mechanisms, but of the effects of the mechanisms--and the possibility, which I will argue for in the 
third chapter of this essay, that the experience of discipline is not assimilated completely by the 
5 It is important to note here that I am not attempting to empirically describe a process; rather I am 
trying to represent, in a theoretical framework which adopts and adapts the insights of Merleau-Ponty 
and Foucault, a way of thinking about the possible simultaneous existence of power relations and 
resistance with the explicit purpose of using this framework to develop a way of looking at freedom 
that avoids the pitfalls of (1) Foucault taken alone and (2) freedom as thought of and acted upon in the 
context of some, but not all, political action in relation to the action of the State and other powerful 
institutions. It is possible to see both resistance and the effects of power in society; the question is what 
is it about the way bodies, power relations and the world come into contact that allows for this 
simultaneous occurrence. It is also important to note here, and I will continue to re-enforce this point, 
that body does not mean constant, a-historical, universal body, nor are world or power meant as constant 
world, constant power. What I do hold, however, is that some body interacts with some world under 
some regime of power relations. I also hold, against Foucault, that the body retains a ability as a node 
of possibility because of its perceptual and motile capabilities-which I see as being denied only in the 
most extreme cases of discipline or oppression. This is not a truth; it is an assertion. 
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body as a task is, because the body--in a relation conditioned by the reflective project of the 
individual--continues to strive toward the world. 
That is, the experience of discipline does not create a fully 'compliant' body as the 
mastering of a task creates a compliant, satisfied subject. The body-subject retains the impressions 
of discipline and punishment; it retains, primordially, a "possible stuff of knowledge" which is the 
actuality of it conformation and the possibility of an alternative understanding. This knowledge in 
the unresisting subject--this 'suspicion' or tension and 'resistance' of the body--remains buried as 
part of the tacit cogito until the "thickness of existence" between the subterranean contact or 
intertwining of world and body overcome; that is, until the tacit cogito is realized--until it becomes 
part of the lived reality of the body-subject. This experience is ambiguous, its ambiguity the result 
of Merleau-Ponty's thesis of the continual transcendence of the world or thing against the striving 
of the body and the body-subject, but a potential experience nonetheless. The ambiguity of this 
experience cannot be stressed enough; it is vital to the understanding of resistance--and thus 
freedom--as a potentiality and not a given, constant state of human existence. This pre-reflective 
experience, I will argue, can result in complicity, unease/tension or resistance. Unease and 
suspicion: the feeling that something isn't right, that there is some reason why I shouldn't be in the 
Anny: this is linked to the body as a knowing body. When this suspicion becomes conscious, the 
possibility of resistance thus arises. 
But if power is understood as pervasive, and if an individual is born into a particular 
regime of power relations, from where does the 'feeling' of 'bumping' up against the world stem; 
from where does this tension arise? Is it not the case that, following Foucault, our bodily and 
mental existence is subject continuously to some modality of power relations, to different degrees 
and in different ways dependent on our specific location socially, culturally and politically--but 
nevertheless are we not in some way still involved in relationships of power? Then from where 
does the this impetus towards resistance originate, if every move re-inserts the body-subject into a 
new regime of power relations, even from birth? 
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The idea of an original 'feeling' is somewhat deceptive in that it seems to pre-suppose that 
at one time we were not subject to power relations. It would be more useful, I think, to understand 
the above formulation as a linked series of moments of existence; a continual process of 
transformation of situation and experience of situation related to the physical and temporal 
movement of the body, but also to the changing of the body itself due to age, and thus the 
changing experience, by the body-subject, of the body. All individuals are born into a certain 
regime of power relations or a certain situation. From then, each individual will grow up, generally 
go to school or get a job, commit some crime and go to prison, become part of a bureaucracy, etc 
(although individuals don't do all these things, or in this order--the point is that each person does 
something constituted by a series of different somethings for different individuals). So what? The 
point is this: within a given disciplinary regime or regime of power relations, and within the 
particular trajectory of an individual's life, there is a multiplicity of experience. Life can be 
understood as a process of becoming or transfiguration--not toward some inevitable end-point and 
not equivalently for each individual subject, but toward a horizon which recedes continuously until 
death--with moments of happiness and success and moments of setback and pain. The mechanisms 
of discipline, and the power relations implicit in those mechanisms and the discourses associated 
with them, must understood as working on a body and affecting a body-subject who moves 
through subtly changing situations. Each moment of becoming--or every setback and moment of 
pain--stands as a potential "bump" against the world. The body itself also gradually changes; the 
capabilities of our bodies grow as we reach adulthood, and generally decrease with age. We are not 
simple vessels into which the stuff of power and knowledge is poured. It seems, furthermore, that 
even if we were, when that vessel (us) finally cracked at the moment of resistance the repair of the 
crack would be infinitely more difficult that the original pouring. Thus it seems that from this 
point, a discussion of freedom can be developed which pays specific attention to Foucault's 
concept of power relations and to the potentiality that I argue, with Merleau-Ponty and against 
Foucault, rests in our bodies. 
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I am trying to paint a picture of pre-reflective subjectivity--to put into words a way of 
understanding the state of subjectivity before resistance becomes a conscious activity. The paints 
and brushes I have are composed of texts--those of Merleau-Ponty and Foucault. But the 
phenomenological brushes paint ambiguously, and Foucault's brushes are new--they are not well 
broken in and come in only one size, and thus the picture they paint is haphazard. The paints are 
vague and hazy--there are no striking colors, only shades and tints. Thus my Merleau-
Pontian/Foucaultian picture is one of tension, confusion, suspicion, and ambiguity. The only thing 
one can make out clearly among the chaos of strokes and colors, the globs of world and power 
relations, is a relatively solid body, its limbs intertwined and enmeshed in the world and in power, 
as if it was trying to slip free. With every new moment, as new strokes or colors are added, the 
picture changes--the body in response to the world, power relations and the reflective activity of 
the subject (and vice-versa). 
This picture is one of created and disciplined subjectivity in a state of flux; in tension and 
wavering between complicity and resistance before, finally but not inevitably, resistance enters 
consciousness. No body-subject is every completely compliant, nor is one ever completely free; it 
is a relationship which exists in three components, world, body and power relations, and these 
three components, these axes of existence which converge into a body-subject, are mutable. Each 
component/axis is historical, temporal and malleable. But has my question been answered? What 
causes the body-subject to try to bridge the gap between--what? Between mind and body? And 
thus between knowledge and non-knowledge? Merleau-Ponty, as I will show in a later chapter, 
has shown that idea to be untenable, or at least put it in a vulnerable position. Between power 
relations and freedom? The relations of power and freedom are mutualists, according to Foucault. 
Then what is it? It is not, I think, a question of understanding freedom and resistance in terms of a 
shift from one state to another. Rather resistance is a constant possibility of existence, which can 
emerge as a conscious factor in an individual's life when the 'time is right'; this possibility is 
centered around the body as a lived body and as a knowing body (but is not caused by the body). 
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M.C. Dillon, a Merleau-Ponty scholar, states that "One must not forget that the body has an 
interrogative function; it is a questioning of the world, and its motility is a response to the 
questions the world raises. "6 It is this interrogative function to which I attach such importance, and 
it is why I feel justified in calling the body suspicious. When the world, so to speak, creates it own 
answers--that is, when the subject is embedded in a specific regime of power relations--the 
interrogative function of the body is 'confused'. Fundamentally, however, this function is not 
removed. Following Merleau-Ponty, to 'remove' it would require the removal of the body from the 
world or a denial of the body which limits its status to a mere lump of matter in which a 'soul' or 
mind is imprisoned. According to Merleau-Ponty, this removal or denial is absurd, because it 
would require a denial of what (1) he sees as the key to subjectivity itself and (2) goes against the 
experience of actually having a body (this notion will be developed further in the third chapter). 
There are no necessary or universal answers to this interrogation; only sets of possible answers. 
Power relations create one set, yet the other possibilities remain as modalities of the body's 
existence in the world; hence the possibility of resistance. These other possibilities, alternative 
answers to the body's interrogation of the world, are not understandable apart from the relations of 
power: they are the result of the body's interrogation of a world whose very configuration in terms 
of thing, practices, cultures and know ledges is implicated in the manifestation of power relations. 
What does my picture look like now? I am, still, attempting to paint the landscape of pre-
reflective existence beneath the swface of calm, rational, seemingly normal existence. It is a picture 
of a series of tumultuous interactions and sets of interlocking and mutually re-enforcing 
relationships between the body as a knowing body, the world, power relations, and ultimately, the 
reflecting subject. The body in this landscape is a seat of interrogation (a node of possibility) which 
discipline conforms, confusing its vision and its questioning while at the same time creating further 
questions, more interesting and possibly freeing questions. Hence I have thus far characterized the 
body as 'suspicious' and pre-reflective existence as uneasy or conflictual. It is as if the body sees 
something different--a range of somethings--from what the mind sees--as Foucault claims "the soul 
6 Dillon, M.C. Merleau-Ponty's Ontology 
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is the prison of the body." (DP, p. 30). Yet there is no wall between the soul and the body, but 
rather a haze or lens created by the relations of power. The world raises questions which are 
answered not by the he subject through the body, but by the body-subject's existence in a 
particular regime of power and knowledge relations. Yet in questioning the world, continuously 
and through time, the body allows the body-subject to question his or her own subjectivity, and 
thus question the very mechanisms and relationships from which 'subjectivity' stems. When 
somehow these two worlds--the reflective world of the normal and safe and the pre-reflective 
world, from which the "normal" drawn, of possibility--are brought together then it might by 
possible to see clearly, or at least see something. Whether or not this picture is clear enough (real 
enough?) to be useful will remain unclear until I have examined my tools, my paints and brushes--
Foucault and Merleau-Ponty. 
D. Some pre-suppositions 
This argument is based on a number of pre-suppositions. First, I follow the 
phenomenological contention of the primacy of the body-world interaction and the inherent 
possibility of knowledge which rests in the body as a node or center of perceptual synthesis and 
motility. This seems silly. Why do I have to defend the idea that the body can see and feel and 
move and that this has results which affect the way we think? Does it not follow that we think 
about something because we see, touch or come into some contact, through our bodies, with it ? 
There are reasons for this defense, however, related to the notion of historically created bodies. 
That is, some theorists, following Foucault, have made plausible arguments concerning the work_ 
of power on the actual physical ability of the body itself--in fact on the very structure of the body. 
The viability of the thesis of bodily possibility will be defended in the third chapter, which will deal 
with Merleau-Ponty's work and his extensive revision of the object status of the body. I suppose 
one could argue that there was no potential inherent in the body in terms of its 
perceptuaVmotile/physical capabilities. Or, which seems more plausible, that our body's potential 
is irrelevant in terms of our possible self-understanding, knowledge or potential for freedom--thus 
relegating both the body and the mind to the chance affects history, power, etc. These questions 
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will be dealt with shortly; for now it seems that Nietzsche, as usual, said it best" ... for in what 
does one a present believe in more firmly that one's body?"7 
The second and third pre-suppositions concern temporality and power relations. Merleau-
Ponty proposes a temporal facet to existence, which links the possibility of knowledge to temporal 
nature of the body and body-subject's existence in or of the world. I will argue in the third chapter 
that this temporal facet to existence is vital to understanding the potential of resistance in that it 
provides for the repeated encountering and re-encountering of the physical and mental modality of 
disciplinary or normalizing power relations; it is this persistence of the body which, through time, 
links the possibility of present resistance to the sedimentary and current experience the effects of 
power relations. The third pre-supposition follows from and is related to the second: that 'power' 
is a force subject to ebb and flow; that it is not a constant force applied to body and mind. For this 
reason, the temporal nature of existence, and the differential of experience related to temporality 
allows for subtle breaks with the effects of power relations; or, the body's movement through time 
and space allows for gaps and faults. I think support for his contention can be found in Foucault 
himself, and this support will be explicated in the next chapter. 
The final pre-supposition concerns the possibility of resistance and freedom. I understand 
this essay to be an attempt to facilitate an understanding of resistance, not an attempt to prove that 
resistance is inevitable (a proposition which seems to have little chance of success--historical 
materialism stands as an example such a failure). Much as it seemed silly to defend the idea that the 
body can move, touch and see, it seems unnecessary as well to argue that people actually do ( or 
can) resist discipline, normalization, etc. Again, however, I am not attempting to show that 
individuals do in fact resist. Rather, I want to understand resistance and freedom as historical and 
contemporary phenomena of existence; potentialities related to both the existence of power relations 
and to the body; modalities of existence which are not entirely random, not chance happenings, yet 
not inevitable consequences of some essential nature of humanity. It is possible--! think--to look at 
the world or history and see the work and effect of 'power', as characterized by Foucault, and 
7 From Beyond Good and Evil 
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equally possible to see resistance and refusal. What I am attempting to develop out of Foucault and 
Merleau-Ponty is a framework for understanding the relationship between the body, the world and 
power relations/reflective existence which makes a Foucaultian concept of power coherent and at 
the same time explains why a subject might come to resist. Thus I have arrived at a final pre-
supposition: that resistance, and therefore freedom, are in fact comprehensible phenomena, and not 
subject to contingency or fate alone. 
E. Why a theoretical analysis of freedom; Or, why discuss freedom in these terms 
If nothing else, I hope to show in this essay the possibility of freedom, and in showing that 
possibility which in fact is the possibility of resistance, take one step toward understanding the 
'nature(s)' of freedom in terms of the specific situation of late-modernity in which we live. The 
parameters of body, world and power relations which define this undertaking (in conjunction with 
the possible reflective activity of the subject) are relatively simple in that they are just three 
components or three variables, albeit ones which interact in a multiplicity of different ways; yet 
they elude measurement or rigorous definition. Why? Power, for Foucault, is something that is 
exercised; it is a result of strategies, even necessities, of human domination. It does not rest in 
human or institutional hands, although the effects of power relations, and the mechanisms and 
relationships from which they arise, are manifested in discourses of knowledge and in the 
production of materially useful and compliant bodies, both of which serve the needs of those who 
are "in power" in the traditional sense of the phrase. Power relations are linked to institutions, 
customs and practices in which the work of humanity is implicated, yet power is not possessed in 
terms of wealth, military strength or any other common unit of political, social or economic force 
or strength. 'Power' is thus difficult due to its dual nature as a 'real' relationship of force and a 
diffuse, subtle category which can not be grasped as a material thing or held in the hands of a 
ruling group or class. 
And what of body and world? Merleau-Ponty claims that our body is "our means of having 
a world," yet our world, and thus the knowledge which stems from our 'grip' on the world, is 
ambiguous. We have a hold on the world, and we can potentially 'know' something of the world, 
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but our knowledge is never complete; there is always some invisibility present as part of our 
existence. Merleau-Ponty attempts to show, successfully I think, that theoretical attempts to grasp 
the world totally or in terms of cause and effect fundamentally misrepresented the 'nature' of 
existence. Thus both method and life contain some ambiguity. Both the body/world interaction and 
the relations of power, therefore, have certain characteristics which make them inaccessible to 
empirical or sociological analysis. I am arguing that the categories of body, world and power 
relations, in the way they were understood by Merleau-Ponty and Foucault, are important to 
understanding freedom. As such, it seems that to arrive at a comprehensible and useful 
understanding of freedom, I must proceed with Foucault and Merleau-Ponty in a manner attentive 
to their methods and conclusions; thus the approach to the problem at hand is a theoretical one. 
What then makes this argument adequate? I am basing my argument to some extent on the 
assertion that Foucault. was right somehow in identifying an element of existence which he termed 
"disciplinary power" and that this element of existence modifies and influences in important ways 
the way we live and understand the world and ourselves. It is impossible to create a model of 
power relations ( except through an extreme abstraction, such as Bentham's Panopticon) and 
equally impossible to quantify the affects of 'power' on different body-subjects and in doing so 
argue whether or not these subjects are free, as one might e.,hen making an argument outlining 
the relationship between the State and individual as conceived by liberal political thought. It is no 
less possible to empirically describe the relationship between body and world as put forth by 
Merleau-Ponty without abandoning the insights which his work provides. Thus I am proceeding 
with this discussion using the terms and methods with which I have been provided. 
Fundamentally, both Merleau-Ponty and Foucault, as we will see in later chapters, argue that the 
search for knowledge is not quite as clear cut as it once seemed to be; as it is to the social sciences. 
The adequacy of my argument rests, I suppose, on its usefulness in understanding freedom, its 
internal coherence, and the note of familiarity it strikes in the reader--its relevance to their 
experience. It is not a question of establishing the truth about freedom, since what I have argued so 
far indicates that there is no truth about freedom to be established. Rather my reasons for this 
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methcx:l of inquiry rest on providing and articulation of a possible way of looking at freedom, 
based on certain pre-suppositions and with the intention of providing a useful reference, at least for 
myself, for understanding freedom in terms of it political and personal meaning. 
F. What Comes Next 
Until my argument concerning resistance is clearly put forth, it does not seem useful to 
make any conclusions about the nature of a possible theory of freedom derived from the work of 
Foucault and Merleau-Ponty. It does seem useful, however, to in fact make this argument. Thus in 
the following two chapters I will attempt to explicate the argument I have put forth in this 
introductory chapter. Chapter 2 will look at the work of Foucault in Discipline and Punish with the 
intention of illustrating relationship between the body, the world as a system or field spaces, 
things, others, practices, etc., and power relations as they are manifested in the lived reality of the 
body-subject. I will then proceed to a discussion of the relevance of this work to any possible 
theorizing about freedom. Chapter 3 will examine the work of Merleau-Ponty in order to link his 
thesis of the knowing body to the conclusions made by Foucault and elaborated upon in the 
previous chapter. Finally, in the fourth chapter I will attempt to sketch the outlines of the theory of 
freedom which follows from points about resistance and the possibility of a tensional subjectivity 




This project began with Foucault: with the tension between the insights he provides and the 
problems to which those insights lead. As such, I have chosen to begin the main body of the paper 
with a detailed look at the one particular portion of his work upon which I will draw: his analysis 
of the development of power relations in society, or what might be called his "theory of power." 
Or, from a different angle, what might be called his method of history: the tracing of the linked and 
interrelated development of (a) systems of knowledge and (b) the practices, discourses and 
institutions into which these systems are bound up--a method which takes power as an 
fundamental factor in the production of knowledge, 'truth', and bodies. In a sense, his "theory of 
power" or "method of history" are one and the same thing. Foucault's writing, at least in Discipline 
and Punish. is at once method and argument, theory and substance. That is, to say Foucault has a 
"theory of power" is somewhat misleading, in that he does not discuss power relations as constant 
relations of any society; rather he articulates the relations of power which are manifested in a 
particular set of historical transformations. Hence his work presents certain difficulties. 
This inspection of Foucault will be done in two overlapping and related segments. I will 
begin with Foucault's 'theory' of power/knowledge relations in order to clarify a number of 
points, points fundamental to the argument of this essay, about his thought. It is necessary, I 
would argue, to develop a clear understanding of how Foucault understood the relationship 
between (a) the mind and the body (part B of this chapter) and between (b) the amalgam of body 
and mind which is any given individual and the world in the context of his analysis of power and 
knowledge relations (part C of this chapter). To be more precise, I intend to explore, in parts B and 
C, Foucault's understanding the means by which a relationship between mind and body comes into 
being-in terms of the body's existence in a field of relationships and mechanisms through which a 
regime of power relations are manifested; that is, how this relationship is created, formed, 
constituted, etc. 
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From there, I will attempt to identify what features of Foucault's work are important to a 
discussion of freedom; that is, I will attempt to identify the political implications of his work (part 
D of this chapter). Although Discipline and Punish reeks of politics, the smell stems from the 
implications of his theory and philosophy, or the new avenues of inquiry and new questions raised 
by his thought, rather then directly from the text itself. Specifically, I wish to explicate the 
consequences of this particular work on any thinking or practice of freedom. This should be 
understood as an attempt to draw out both the conclusions made by Foucault in relation to his own 
writing and theorizing, and the implications for politics, both in terms of strengths and limitations, 
he failed to identify for methodological or other reasons. Much of what Foucault had to say about 
'politics' was said later in his career, more or less a decade after Discipline and Punish was 
written. An argument could be made that there is evidence of a significant shift in his positions 
between the writing Discipline and Punish and Foucault's death in 1984. Although I am not 
attempting to establish the continuity or lack of continuity in Foucault's work, I will be attentive to 
this possibility, since what I am calling his "theory of power" is drawn from Discipline and Punish 
almost exclusively and not later or earlier works. 
In short, this chapter stands as an attempt to lay the foundation for the arguments 
concerning resistance and freedom put forth in the first chapter. It will involve, in some ways, a 
critique of Foucault as well as an explication or an attempt at interpretation of his work. I feel 
Foucault to be lacking in certain areas, particularly in relation to his treatment of the body.1 It 
seems, however, that Foucault's work has a unique malleability to it. In his efforts to avoid 
'totalizing' theory, he left room for late-comers like myself to pick and chose at his leavings; to 
take what seems relevant and discard the rest--while, at the same time, trying place oneself into a 
position which is not undermined by the part of Foucault one chose not to emphasize. I hope to 
1 This might seem strange, given the fact the body plays a major role in Foucault's work; there is a 
"political technology" of the body; the body "is always at issue". However, I am not arguing that 
Foucault ignored the body; rather I will question the status of the Foucaultian body in terms of the body 
as a "lived body" or a "phenomenal body". In other words, I will argue that Foucault, though he 
certainly doesn't ignore the body, fails to recognize in the body any quality other than that of a vessel 
for power; in short, he sees the body as an object, where I will argue, following Merleau-Ponty, that the 
body is both object and subject. Or, in being both it is neither. 
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begin to raise the necessary questions in this chapter, and make a provisional and tentative start at 
answering them as part of the larger goal of sketching a theory of freedom. As I have stated, the 
main question I have involved myself in at this stage is "Why does a subject resist?" With this 
question clearly in mind, it seems like I might as well begin, at the start: with Foucault's basic 
notion of body and mind--or how a relationship between body and mind becomes a 'reality' --as he 
puts it forth in Discipline and Punish. 
B. Body and Soul 
Discipline and Punish is not explicitly about "POWER" in the way this essay is supposed 
to be about "FREEDOM". It is rather a historical narrative of sorts, in which Foucault details, 
explains and characterizes specific transformations in the realms of punishment and discipline. In 
doing so, Foucault exposes the radical transformation of how we--meaning Western, particularly 
European, and even more particularly French individuals--understand criminality, normalacy and 
penality. This discussion, ostensibly about penality and "The Birth of the Prison," is also about 
how things become to be "normal," how societies function generally, and how knowledges--all 
knowledges, not only our knowledge of penality and the criminal--are produced; not discovered, 
not intuited, but produced. 
According to Foucault, our understanding--including our specific 'scientific' knowledge of 
humanity--of what is criminal, what is right and wrong, and what is normal, is subject to power. 
That is, the changes in our understanding of crime and punishment, normality and abnormality, is 
not, as has been often claimed, linked to greater humanization or liberalization of society or a 
greater care for humanity and thus a wish to liberalize punishment. Rather it is the case that our 
understanding of the truth or value of what is good and normal is linked to what Foucault terms a 
"micro-physics" of power. This micro-physics, as it turns out, invests the body through networks 
of techniques, methods, practices, and strategies which are analogous to the systems (and 
discourses) of punishment we see ourselves as evaluating as more humane. Furthermore, this 
reversal of cause, if one can call it that, is indicative of a much larger phenomena: the claim made 
by Foucault that all knowledges, all understanding, are linked fundamentally to power relations 
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through a multiplicity of mechanisms. In this specific picture of punishment and penality Foucault 
sees mechanisms which are replicated throughout society as a whole. Thus power is not only a 
factor in the prison or the courts, but a general element of society. This is a rough sketch of the 
some of the lines of thought in Discipline and Punish. 
Foucault sees in the development of the power to punish a series of linked relationships, 
and a transformation. Where before the "body of the condemned" was attacked physically, 
tortured, executed, mutilated, etc., the late 18th and 19th century saw a shift in the application of 
punishment; the body faded, so to speak, from public and theoretical view as the object of the 
wrath of law and society. Punishment was no longer confined to destruction of the body; the point 
of application remained bodily, but the 'object' was transformed. Punishment, argues Foucault, 
became creative, purposive, intentional--and oriented toward a new object: the 'soul' of the modem 
individual.2 In looking at the development ofpenality, one can "map a displacement of its 
application [from body to soul]; and through this displacement, a whole field of recent objects, a 
whole new system of truth .•. " (DP, p. 22-23). This resulted in the power to punish, and thus the 
"punitive measures It which constituted this power, becoming "linked to a whole series of positive 
and useful effects" (DP, p. 24). Nevertheless, "it is always the body that is at issue" in discipline: 
"the body and its forces, their utility and their docility,· their distribution and their submission." The 
2 It is not entirely clear what Foucault intended in his use of the world soul. The use of the world 'soul' 
in French has connotations not present in the English usage, and it is beyond the scope of this paper and 
beyond the language capabilities of the author of this essay. Some possibilities: to be soul-less is to be 
inhumaine, or inhuman, and destruction of the soul is demoralizing. Foucault's use of the world soul, 
rather than subjectivity, consciousness or mind, allows him to remove his thought, at least on the 
surface, from the sedimentary meaning of some previous discourse while at the same time referring to 
other discourse which employed 'soul' specifically. By referring to the soul as "the factor which 
inhabits [us] and brings [us] to existence" he establishes the ambiguity or constructedness of what has 
been considered to be the key element of human existence, of our very subjectivity, including our mind 
and the way we think. Foucault wants to avoid using the traditional language of philosophical 
investigation, but the soul he refers to is meant, I would argue, to encompass all those categories 
(physche, subjectivity, consciousness); thus Foucault, in using the word soul, intends to infer the 
constructed nature of our humanity, not only our minds. There might be some difficulty in my equating 
the soul with the mind; it would probably be more accurate to say that Foucault considered the mind to 
be a particular element of the soul, along with other elements such as sexuality, etc. Furthermore, this 
connotation of the word soul is interesting, especially in the context of this essay. If one followed this 
argument to one possible conclusion, one could propose a neglect in Foucault's work for the body, or an 
objectification of the body inherent within the structure of his argument. This will be pursued in the 
third chapter. 
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body is "directly involved in a political field; power relations have an immediate hold upon it; they 
invest i4 mark it, train it, torture it, force it to carry out tasks, to perform ceremonies, to emit 
signs" (DP, p. 25). Yet the body, due to these transformations, had a different role to play. 
Under the new regime of discipline and punishment, the body became the means by which 
punishment was exercised, rather than the end; the new techniques of punishment intended to tum 
the body into a key used, supposedly, to unlock the secrets of the soul of the criminal and thus 
reform him or her. However, Foucault argued that the techniques of punishment, although 
designed to reach into and through the body to the soul, had radically different results. The modem 
soul, although theoretically the new object of punishment and knowledge, as if it was discovered 
somehow in the tortured bodies of the previous era, is the result rather than the object of the new 
regime of power relations. There is, argues Foucault, a link between the power relations which 
invest the body--the political and strategic field in which the body is suspended--and the 
discursive, knowledge-seeking activities which surround and develop out of this body-power 
relationship. The result of the link is an object of knowledge, the soul, and a useful yet subjugated 
body. Or, from the relations in which the body exists comes the soul; the soul being the "element" 
of existence, the historical reality, to which philosophy and the human science have addressed its 
efforts under the rubric of "psyche, subjectivity, personality, consciousness, etc." (DP, p. 29). It 
is this soul which in tum addresses itself to the body, the world and itself as objects of knowledge. 
Yet this soul is not a theoretical fiction. It is neither "an illusion" nor "is it an ideological 
effect" (DP, p. 29). Rather: 
.. .it exists, it has a reality, it is produced permanently around, on, within the body 
by the functioning of a power that is exercised on those punished--and, in a more 
general way, on those one supervises, trains and corrects, over madmen, children 
at home and at school, the colonized, over those who are stuck at a machine and 
supervised for the rest of their lives (DP, p. 29). 
In short, the reality that is the modem 'soul' is produced in all of us; since, it seems, all of us have 
been in some way "subjected" to the "political technology of the body." We are all, differentially, 
part of the "political 'anatomy'" of the body; subjects in the "body politic," and are invested by the 
" ... set of material elements and techniques that serve as weapons, relays, communication routes 
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.and support for the power and knowledge relations that invest human bodies and subjugate them .. 
. " (DP, p. 28). In our souls, if we could in fact look at them, we could see "the effects of a certain 
type of power and the reference to a certain type of knowledge" (DP, p. 29). 
Though it is difficult to pin down a 'mind-body relationship' in the work of Foucault, his 
ideas are not entirely inaccessible to a formulation which puts the soul, the element of existence 
which is at once an object of knowledge and a medium of knowledge, body and power in a 
understandable configuration. Foucault argues that there is a interaction between the body and the 
particular political field to which a body is subject which is instrumental in determining how the 
elusive third element of existence, the soul which "inhabits" us, comes into being as a reality to the 
subject and as an object of knowledge. The subject--object distinction, in this view, is merely a 
power effect; as a result of the particular constellation of techniques and practices to which we are 
subject there has arisen, historically, as a modality of the our strategic insertion into a political 
field, defined by particular relations of power, a conception of our mind as subject and our body as 
object. This is interesting in itself, for it leads one to conclude that the body is not the prison of the 
soul; that we are not held down, or kept unfree, by the bad luck of getting stuck in an organic form 
which has 'desires,' 'passions,' etc. and eventually gets old and dies. In fact it might lead one to 
conclude that we might be more free if we abandoned that conception; in fact it has. What then? 
The power relations to which an individual is subject are constituted by a particular 
arrangement of things and practices; this political technology of the body is "diffuse, [and] rarely 
formulated in systematic discourse," and comprised of "bits and pieces" which "implement a 
disparate set of tools or methods" (DP, p. 26). All of these elements, however, comprise what can 
be thought of as parts of the world; a world encountered by the 'soul' anterior to the encounter of 
the world by the body and whose encounter conditioned by that original meeting (of body and 
political field). Our bodies exist in the world and the configuration of the same world defines and 
constitutes a field of power and knowledge relations. From this field, comprised of body and 
world, stems a soul which looks at the world, with blind eyes it seems, and at itself. For Foucault 
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"the soul is the effect and instrument of a political anatomy; the soul is the prison of the body" (DP, 
p. 30). 
It is important, I think, to understand power relations as being of the world (in the 
phenomenological sense) in order to understand resistance. Yet this soul, the effect of power 
relations, "is itself a factor in the mastery that power exercises over the body" (DP, p. 30). Our 
'soul' is the historical reality which constitutes our ability to understand ourselves, in that it is the 
object of knowledge upon which we would reflect. Our 'soul' is both our means of self-
understanding and it is what needs to be understood; it is who we are, what "brings us to life." 
And yet our constructed subjectivity, the soul to which the communion of body and power 
relations gives birth, acts to harness the potentiality of our bodies--the same bodies which 
constitute our soul as vectors of the power and knowledge relations which define the world; in 
other words which forms us as human beings. 
In this we see a further element of Foucault's conception of the body as related to the 
mind, to what has been called subjectivity, and in this element we can see some of the dilemma 
Foucault's thought offers to a discussion of freedom. The soul, mind, or subjectivity is both 
created and a force in itself, in that it acts to control the body. It is somewhat of a reciprocal 
relationship, in which the world/power relations serve as mediator between the mind and body. 
Must there be somewhere in this corpus of thought a means of "communication" between mind and 
body, between the element of existence, the soul, which is our humanity and the body which it 
"occupies"? Foucault does not as of yet provide details as to how our body and soul re-enforce the 
domination of each other, yet they are not totally distinct entities. And, importantly, he does not 
explain what might lead us to resist these power relations. This is the original problematic. I have 
argued in the previous chapter that the impetus for resistance can be found in the body; there is, 
within Discipline and Punish, evidence that Foucault saw resistance in a similar light However, 
there is evidence that he did not as well. In addition, within Foucault's concept of power there is 
room for slack (a term borrowed from William Connolly, but used in a different manner) and 
tension, both of which must be considered. 
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The diffuse nature of the systems, tools, practices and methods which comprise the world 
embodied by power relations has already been pointed out. Although Foucault considers the non-
systematicity of power relations to have overall affects, the relations of power which define the 
systems of punishment and confinement, and systems in society in general, "are not univocal; they 
define innumerable points of confrontation, focuses of instability, each of which has its own risks 
of conflicts, of struggles, and at least temporary inversions ... " (DP, p. 27). The picture looks 
much like a web in which fly-like subjects are caught; they can struggle free, but their struggle only 
results in further capture, in a different part of the web: "one should take as its model perpetual 
battle" (DP, p. 26). The power in which individuals are caught up in "invests them, is transmitted 
by them and through them; it exerts pressure on them, just as they themselves, in their struggle 
against it, resist the grip it has on them" (DP, p. 27). Where does all this tension come from? From 
a soul, whose reality is a product of power, whose self-reflection can only fail to see behind the 
constructed subjectivity, because there is nothing else? The tension, then, must come from the 
body; or from a soul which is created resistant--which is just another way of saying from the body 
and the political field ( which is of the world) in which the body is embedded. Foucault does not 
assert this, he only hints at it; to assert it would be to provide individuals with some sort of 
essential humanity, which I believe he wants to avoid. As I have pointed out, however, it is not 
particularly startling to claim that a body contains the potential to interact with world and that 
interaction leads to a certain potential for knowledge. 
Some inkling of this conclusion concerning the bcxly can be found in the final passages of 
the first chapter of Discipline and Punish: "The Body of the Condemned." Foucault asserts that his 
conclusion that punishment and prison belong to a "political technology of the body" comes from 
an examination of recent history. In "recent" prison revolts and struggles--against the cold and 
suffering associated with imprisonment, but also against the "model prison"--Foucault sees 
"revolts, at the level of the body, against the very body of the prison." At issue is the prison's 
"very materiality as an instrument and vector of power" (DP, p. 30). What is he saying? That the 
prison rebellions he saw constituted resistance against the world/prison as a conforming agent of 
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the body? Foucault asserts that "all of these movements ... have been about the body and material 
things" (DP, p. 30). This is the thread of analysis that I intend to follow. A revolt--at the level of 
the body--against the body of the prison? Or, a revolt, at the level of the body, against that in 
society which conforms us overall. I intend to argue that by understanding the body as a lived 
body, which experiences the world through perception as a part of itself and strives toward the 
world before the advent of conscious experience, one can arrive at a framework which understands 
resistance to the effects of power relations originally in terms of a struggle at the level of the body; 
a battle in which the sound and clamor of conflict might leak into the consciousness of an 
individual. 
It might be the case, after all, that our souls are never completely constructed in, around, 
or on our bodies. Or, that in living, we undergo a process of possible reconstruction of 
subjectivity, of our 'soul'--this reconstruction might be characterized by resistance, rather than by 
the micro-physics of power alone. Or, the very construction of our subjectivities/soul might be the 
result of an interaction, a conflict, between body and world (possibly with a small pinch of agency 
thrown in as well?). Foucault not only leads one to re-think freedom in terms of looking "into the 
depths of society" for what might constrain us, he also makes one think that the question of 
freedom is intimately linked to what it means to be have a soul, or to be a 'subject'; and the 
constructedness of our subjectivity leads one to think of freedom historically. The possible 
answers to these questions will be raised in the course of this essay (in Chapter 3, specifically in 
the section entitled "Resistance"); for now the mechanism of power, the interaction of the body 
with the techniques, spaces and practices of the world--that is, how power relations are manifested 
as part of the lived reality of the subject--must be made clear, since, it seems, to understand 
resistance one must first understand the factors which create a relationship of power. 
C. Body and World 
"In the first instance, discipline proceeds from the distribution of individuals in space" (DP, 
p. 141). So Foucault prefaces his description of the techniques of discipline--the specific 
mechanisms by which "subjugated and practiced bodies" or "'docile' bodies" are produced in the 
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"machinery of power that explores [the human body], breaks it down and rearranges it" in order · 
keep the body at once "productive" and "subjugated" (DP, p. 138). These mechanisms are minute; 
they are scattered and diffuse; yet overall these subtle, "cunning" techniques must be "situated not 
only in the inextricability of a functioning, but in the coherence of a tactic" (DP, p. 139). The 
mechanisms Foucault describes--the discipline which is inscribed into our bodies--is constitutive of 
"a political anatomy of detail" (DP, p. 139). Thus not only are these mechanisms vital in the 
formation of our bodies and souls, they are strategic and tactical: they have a purpose. 
Foucault is not a simple ( or a complex) materialist: the world of techniques and methods 
which he describes are located in the larger plane of political, economic and social functioning and 
are directly connected to discursive (knowledge seeking) projects. That is, we are not just results 
of our world, we exist as we do--and, for example, commit crime as we do--for specific reasons 
related to the economic, political and social uses of us as individuals--although not, I understand 
Foucault to be saying, as part of an overall 'grand scheme' of a ruling class or group: 
In fact, the shift [from one form of criminality to another] forms part of a whole 
complex mechanism, embracing the developments of production, the increase of 
wealth, a higher juridical an moral value placed on property relations, stricter 
methods of surveillance, a tighter partitioning of the populace, more efficient 
techniques of locating and obtaining information ... (DP, p. 77) 
In this Foucault, in a sense, is in conversation with traditions which he has refuted elsewhere 
(including Marxism and even existentialism). Fundamentally, the character of power relations is 
related to historically specific movements in the realms of economics and politics; furthermore it 
should be made cleat that Foucault is not alone in this assertion. I will return to this problematic in 
part D of this chapter. First, it is necessary to examine the specific mechanisms of discipline 
themselves, in terms of spaces, things and bcx:lies and the temporal and visual relations which 
underlie these relationships. 
a. Spaces . 
For Foucault, discipline begins with the ordering, ranking and classification of individuals 
into useful space. That is, "the disciplines create complex spaces that are once architectural, 
functional and hierarchical" (DP, p. 148). Bodies are inserted into these spaces, ranked, classified 
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and thus controlled. The disciplinary mechanism of ordering bcxlies and spaces together has as its 
aim "knowing, mastering and using" (DP, p. 143). By ranking and classifying individuals into 
specific spaces and by controlling their movements and activities in that space, discipline becomes 
wound into individuals; they lose themselves its grasp. Yet, and this is key, discipline 
"Individualizes bcxlies by a location that does not give them a fixed position, but distributes them 
and circulates them in a network of spaces" (DP, p. 146). Thus discipline is not just the forceful 
control of the motility and abilities of bodies, though this is certainly a factor. It is both the 
organization of space and the organization of knowledge of space and the bcxlies ('subjects') 
which/who occupy that space. In simple terms, bodies under a disciplinary regime are kept where 
they belong both in terms their physical location and their location in a hierarchy of knowledge: 
"the unit is, therefore, neither the territory (unit of domination), nor the place (unit of residence), 
but the rank: the place one occupies in a classification" (DP, p. 145). 
However, it seems that Foucault considered the ranking and classification of individuals to 
be directly linked to the orientation of a particular body into a particular space or set of spaces and 
the control or arrangement of the bcxly in these spaces. Thus the possibility of control, I would 
argue, is directly related to the space in which the individual occupies and what the individual does 
or is forced to do in that space. For example, ones status as a worker or student corresponds to the 
place assigned to an individual in the factory or the school, and to the categories 'worker' or 
'student' (or madman, or deviant, or criminal) as these classifications are manifested in discourses 
of knowledge. I do not simply need to be kept in school to be disciplined, I must be ranked as a 
'student', understood as a 'student', etc. in relation to the use of 'students' in society and I must 
fear the penality which accompanies deviance from the understood norm of 'student'; this "allows 
both the characterization of the individual and the ordering of a given multiplicity. It is ... the base 
for a micro-physics of what might be called a 'cellular' power" (DP, p. 149). To rank and classify 
requires that the objects of classification be coordinated in an orderly and stable fashion. 
b. Things 
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Thus we can see the link between discipline and the ordering and classifying individuals 
within space. What then happens within that variable space? Foucault gives examples of how, 
within these spaces, a "sort of anatomo-chronological schema of behavior is defined" through the 
training and disciplining of the boqy (DP, p. 152). That is, within the space of discipline, a space 
that is both real in that tangible and ideal in that it is functional and useful, the movements and 
gestures of the body are .placed in a controlled articulation with the things of the world--an 
articulation that maximizes the efficiency of the body and minimizes its rebellion. The experience of 
the soldier in the barracks or in training or the worker in the factory, which Foucault consistently 
uses as examples, and the objects to which the body of the soldier or worker is applied is an 
experience of power: "Over the whole surface of contact between the body and the object it 
handles, power is introduced, fastening them to one another. It constitutes a body-weapon, body-
tool, body-machine complex" (DP, p. 153). Thus the experience of discipline is one of a forced 
conjunction between body and object or mechanism: "disciplinary power appears to have the 
function not so much of deduction as of synthesis ... of a coercive link with the apparatus of 
production ... [in the case of a worker]" (DP, p. 153). It is a strategic meeting, which at once 
makes the body a useful force (in war in the case of the soldier and in production in case of the 
worker) and, additionally, a force which can be controlled by the same mechanism by which it is 
made useful. The world and the things of the world are made one with the body, not by the 
inclination of the body toward the world, but by the strategic conjunction of the two forces. 
It is important to understand that what Foucault calls "disciplinary power" is not a constant 
factor of existence; rather it developed in response to specific needs: "an industrial innovation, a 
renewed outbreak of certain epidemic diseases, the invention of the rifle or the victories of Prussia" 
(DP, p. 138). Furthermore, the disciplines, and the power relations associated with the disciplines, 
developed concurrently with--and in relation to--a changing understanding of how bodies function, 
or how people believed them to function. Foucault claims that he is not intending to describe the 
particularities of every institution of discipline, let alone how various disciplinary institutions relate 
to one another on a more general, societal level (DP, p. 139). Rather, he intends "to map on a 
12 
r 
series of examples some of the essential techniques that most easily spread from one to another 
[institution]" (DP, p. 139). Furthermore, to employ his analysis towards the ends of this essay, 
one must understand the historical nature of what Foucault calls "the disciplines" and provide a 
general analysis of how they seem to function today. 
However, his description of the "essential techniques" of discipline, which I have taken so 
far to mean the ranked ordering of bodies into variable spaces and the forced conjunction of body 
and object within that space, allows one to peer into our own society, into our own institutions, to 
see the similarities (and the differences) between the prisons, schools and workshops of 18th and 
19th century France and the institutions of today. The "political anatomy" to which the late 18th 
and early 19th century gave birth was constituted by: 
... a multiplicity of often minor processes, of different origin and scattered 
location, which overlap, repeat, or imitate one another, support one another .. 
. converge and gradually produce the blueprint of a general method (DP, p. 138) 
This general method, it seems, still exists today. Thus though Foucault describes the maneuvers of 
long dead French soldiers, the activities of dead prisoners and the handwriting of dead elementary 
school students, it still seems possible to apply this framework--with certain reservations and 
modifications which I will develop later--to the voters, TV watchers, and 'free-market' participants 
of late-modem Western society; different bodies, different practices and different objects, but all 
linked to each other in a similar way. After all, Foucault viewed his own project of tracing the 
development of the prison and the "genealogy of the modern soul" in terms of "writing a history of 
the present" (DP, p. 31). With this firmly in hand, I will now return to the spaces of discipline. 
c. Visibility and Punishment 
For Foucault, the "exercise of discipline presupposes a mechanism that coerces by means 
of observation" (DP, p. 170). That is, to be disciplined one must be visible, traceable and 
knowable. The architecture of discipline, argues Foucault, encounters a "new problematic" 
previously unknown to architecture (DP, p. 172). A space must now be created which permits "an 
internal, articulated and detailed control .. .in more general terms, an architecture that would 
operate to transform individuals" (DP, p. 172). It is this new principle that characterizes the 
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schools, prisons and workshops of the modem age. Within the new spaces of discipline, 
individuals, since they can be seen and thus be ranked, classified and known, can also be 
organized around a norm: "the perpetual penality that traverses all points and supervises every 
instant in the disciplinary institutions compares, differentiates, hierachizes, homogenizes, 
excludes. In short, it normalizes" (DP, p. 183). To be known, therefore, opens one up to the 
possibility of punishment, and punishment in tum serves to constrain and transform individuals. 
This theme of visibility is elaborated upon in Foucault's extended discussion of Bentham's 
Panopticon: "a diagram of power reduced to its ideal form," a model which "must be understood as 
a generalizable model of functioning; a way of defining power relations in terms of the everyday 
life of men ... [it] .. .is in fact a figure of political technology that may and must be detached from 
any specific use." (DP, p. 205). That is, the Panopticon can be taken as an ideal form of power 
relations which is reproduced on a societal level only partially; the discipline which operates at a 
societal level is in principle similar in nature to the hypothetical Panopticon, though it is in a sense 
not as 'powerful'. In the panoptic model of society/discipline, power "has its principle .. .in a 
certain concerted distribution of bodies, surfaces, lights gazes, in an arrangement whose internal 
mechanisms produce the relation in which individuals are caught up" (DP, p. 202). 
Fundamentally, the configurations of spaces, bodies and objects which ensure our 
visibility--the distribution of individuals in variable spaces and the forced articulation of bodies and 
world--creates a functional "space of domination" in which "disciplinary power manifests its 
potency, essentially, by arranging objects" (DP, p. 187). The body of the individual is one of the 
objects to be arranged. It is within these spaces of domination that "power produces; it produces 
reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth" (DP, p. 194). In a sense, therefore, 
discipline can be seen as a function of a specific relationship between body and world, a 
relationship constituted by the insertion of a body into a variable and meaningful space in which the 
body is controlled, temporally and spatially, and by which the body/individual becomes an object 
of knowledge and thus becomes a dual subject: an individual who is a subject of knowledge 
projects and is subject to power relations. 
14 
I 
d. Institution to Society 
According to Foucault the spaces of discipline, the areas in which power functions as a 
subtle force acting at the level of the articulation of things and bodies, underwent a "historical 
transformation," the subtle shift of coercive mechanisms from the "edges of society" to "the 
gradual extension of the mechanisms of discipline throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, their spread throughout the whole social body, the formation of what might be called in 
general a disciplinary society" (DP, p. 209). Thus one can see in Foucault an argument which 
outlines both the functioning of the institutions of discipline and their extension throughout society 
and a transformation in which "the massive, compact disciplines are broken down into flexible 
methods of control, which may be transferred and adapted" (DP, p. 211). Society then, in 
addition to specific institutions, becomes a space of domination in which the mechanisms which 
characteriz.e the institutions of discipline are replicated on a societal level. 
e. Conclusion 
I think at this point it is possible to make a generalized conclusion about the relationship 
between body and world, as Foucault understands it, in a disciplinary society. Within an institution 
of discipline, the body of an individual is placed into a specific and observable relationship with the 
objects that comprise the spaces of the institution. The body of the individual becomes, in a sense, 
part of the functioning of the machine; a part of the machine-like structure which comprises the 
institution. The forces of the body are made useful by the forceful conjunction of the body and 
object, and the individual is controlled, kept a part of the machine, because he or she can be 
observed within the machine and punished for deviance from the norm. The gestures and 
movements of the body are controlled both in terms of the direction and application of the body's 
forces and in terms of the time taken by each gesture and movement (DP, p. 160). This creates 
both a compliant individual and a knowable individual--knowable as normal or knowable as 
deviant. 
As was argued in the previous section, not only does this affect the body of an individual, 
it mediates a relationship between the 'soul' and the body which the soul inhabits; in short the 
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'individual' I have been speaking of is an effect of this bcxiy, world and power interaction, of the 
"political field" surrounding and investing the bcxiy and controlling its forces. Thus an individual, 
as a result of the working of this machinery, comes to understand him of herself as deviant, as 
normal, etc. The modem individual is "in the panoptic machine, invested by its effects of power, 
which we bring to ourselves since we are part of its mechanism" (DP, p. 217). The institution of 
discipline I have just described becomes, in the mcxiem era, a figure at which one can look to see 
the relationships which organize power relations in society generally. Or, that is what Foucault 
argues. 
The above discussion, I hope, has shown the basic framework of the particular mcxiality of 
power Foucault calls discipline and the practices which constitute what he refers to as the 
'disciplines'. What remains to be seen at this point is how power is manifested in modem, or late-
modem, society. Surely, one might argue, Foucault has made a convincing argument as to the 
functioning of certain specific institutions in the 17th and 18th centuries. But how can this 
argument have any relevance to our society, to the politics which govern our lives? We are, after 
all, more or less grateful participants in a free society, with all the benefits and privileges associated 
with such a society. Aren't we? At this point, I would like to make a tentative argument concerning 
the usefulness of Foucault's work to a political theory of freedom; at the same time, I hope to point 
out the limitations of his theory. 
I read Discipline and Punish on two levels. At one level it is a history of the development of 
penal institutions, particularly European ones, through a certain historical period. The other aim of 
this work, which I see the first as being a foil for, is as the author states a "genealogy of the 
modem soul"; or, how a particular object of knowledge developed in conjunction with the 
techniques which both created and observed the soul. That is, Discipline and Punish is a history of 
the soul, of the individual who might be free, as seen through the lens of the development of penal 
institutions and the shift of the focus, or the reference points, of justice and punishment. What 
Foucault shows so elegantly is the way in which we, as individuals, come into being and how we 
are kept, so to speak, in line. His work, therefore, can be used to argue that the 'freedom' modem 
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individual is as much a part of the work of power relations, or the effect of power relations on 
individual self-understanding, as his or her sexuality, nonnalacy, etc. Thus must we abandon 
freedom? 
Foucault provides not only a history in Discipline and Punish, but a method: an angle from 
which one can approach certain problems, such as the problem of freedom. It is possible, 
following Foucault's conclusions, to begin to look at the problem of freedom not, to take one 
common example, at the interaction between a defined State (as what limits freedom) and a 
universalized individual (as a being who is 'free' before the 'necessary imposition of society/the 
Sate), but rather from the level at which an individual comes into existence as a being in a particular 
regime of power relations of which the State is part. The question one must ask then is this: what 
variables organize this contingent individual's potential for freedom? Following Foucault, the most 
important variable is the relationship between the body of the subject and the world constituted as a 
network of field of disciplinary mechanisms and associated discourses and knowledge projects 
which bring into being an individual, with a soul, and a regime of power relations. I would argue 
that Foucault did not see individuals as mere clay to be molded, but rather as consistently 
unfinished works, with two simultaneous creators: power, and, through resistance to power, a 
subject--but a subject who works within certain specific boundaries. At least, that is how I chose 
to read Foucault. 
D. The Spaces of Discipline (and Freedom?) 
In Foucault's work space, as has been shown above, is a complex category. But think, for 
a moment, of the spaces that organize the lives of the individuals who are said to be free in out 
society in terms of how individuals understand their 'freedom' and how the trajectory of their lives 
unfolds. What I propose, following Foucault, is that the organization of space in our society can be 
equated, in some ways, with the Panoptic space of discipline. For this reason I see Foucault's 
work as vital to understanding the possibility of freedom, if only to understand why people are not 
free. For example, what if we were to take the 'space' of society and politics, overall, as a "space 
of domination?" It would be a complex space, comprised of many little spaces with their own 
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particularities; it would, however, have as its defining characteristic a normalizing function and a 
punishing function, both of which would stem from visibility of those within these spaces and the 
control of the body's interaction with the things which comprise these spaces; punishment 
understood here as not being exclusively physical--that is, it could be moral, social, etc. Again 
following Foucault, these spaces would be differentiated in the specific nature of their functioning, 
thus exposing different individuals to different regimes of power relations. And these spaces 
would be more than architectural or structural; yet the power relations which invests space creates 
walls and barriers as effectively real as ones made of stone. Overall, however, one might be able to 
identify certain general norms, one of which might be 'freedom', and a set of practices which re-
enforce this norm. A more specific formulation of this might clarify my point 
I have argued that visibility (which implies and re-enforces knowability) and the controlled 
articulation of body and world define Foucault's formulation of disciplinary power. I think it is 
easy enough to see how mod.em individuals are made visible. Individuals in society are given 
numbers, files, records, etc. Individuals are classified as such as a result of their race, class, sex, 
etc.; all of these categories and others are more or less open to view and open to rank and 
classification (sexuality although it is less visible publicly is nevertheless subject to the scrutiny of 
others, often by the choice of the individual, as Foucault argues in his History of Sexuality; Vol. 
1). This visibility not only affects our self-understanding--it influences the way we see others, as 
reflections of ourselves or as deviants from the norm to which we compare ourselves and others. 
Our lives have increasingly come under scrutiny and where we are not directly observ~ new 
technologies have opened up the possibility of surveillance. Thus as a result of the development of 
systems of observation and classification individuals understand themselves as potentially 
observable if not actually observed; furthermore, it is possible that this observation and 
classification is deemed necessary by a given individual (perhaps, one might add, to protect their 
'freedom'). And what of our bodies? 
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The spaces in which we exist, I would argue, can be taken as the spaces of the nonnal.3 
Following Foucault, space is physical and architectural, functional and hierarchical, and I think 
political. 'Mcxlem' individuals exist in a regime of power relations which define certain 
possibilities of movement. Space is understood physically in terms of where it is possible to go; 
where the body of the individual can move. Yet space has other dimensions. The physical (and 
functional) dimension of space is normalizing in that our motility is constrained by the view we 
take of certain spaces or certain areas. Phrases like "they live on that side of town," "its not safe to 
go there" or "I would never work there" illustrate how we understand space in terms other than the 
physical possibility of movement--in terms of the function of a space; in terms of what it contains; 
and in terms of its meaning. Thus space, as we apprehend it in a system defined by the norm, is at 
once physical and meaningful; this is not the ultimate determinate of movement, but I think it is a 
factor, and one related to the control of bodies and individuals. Certain areas, certain spaces are 
anathema, not due to a physical inability to move into that space, to grasp it with our bodies, but 
because our potential motility is limited by the ramifications of entry into that space, which is 
related to how we understand ourselves and others, and how we understand out relation to the 
norm in terms of where we are physically. Similarly, we keep (or are kept) to certain spaces. It is 
possible then to see space as hierarchical, as a result of the functional and physical dimension of 
space, in that some spaces are understood as better than others and individuals who occupy those 
spaces or the activities within those spaces as better or worse, depending on their particul~ 
location around the norm. 
Space is political as well, in that some areas are considered the 'arena' of politics while 
others are 'private' and in that our relation to particular spaces has political implications. Within 
these 'political' spaces, our interaction with the world and others--what we do--is organized 
around a norm as well; to vote is normal and an exercise of our freedom, to smash a voting booth 
with a tire iron is a sign of obvious deviance and thus is punishable. Our choice to participate ( or 
3 I use space here to illustrate a general point about the effects of power relations on individuals as 
potentially free beings; the same sort or argument could be made referring specifically to others, actions 
or even language. 
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not) in the political machinery, which is linked in a general sense to how we currently understand 
ourselves as free beings, is limited to particular spaces--the voting booth or the couch in front of 
the TV where we sit to watch election returns--and to particular activities within those spaces. We 
are not forced to participate, we chose, and that is part of how we are implicated in power 
relations. Within the trajectory of our lives we enter and leave certain spaces deemed political; 
politics outside of those spaces is viewed as being outside of the norm or the 'mainstream'. To be 
in particular spaces, spaces where we might not 'belong', has political implications as well. As a 
result, our freedom is attached to certain forms of democracy and politics--forms which we 
ostensibly have chosen, and thus which we cannot see ourselves as resisting. It is as if we lived 
our lives in a labyrinth made of clear, hard plastic which unfolds concurrently with trajectory of 
our lives; the space within the labyrinth is the space of the normal. We don't realize that the barriers 
exist until we take a wrong turn and bump up against them. Thus one can begin to see the various 
dimensions of space and the subtle ways in which we are organized, first as bodies and then as 
reflective beings, into those spaces. 
In order for Foucault's framework of disciplinary power to prove useful in an analysis of 
freedom these arguments must be understood in the context of Foucault's assertion that discipline 
does not individualize by fixing bodies into specific locations, but rather by circulating them 
through a network of diverse spaces. Furthermore, this must be understood in terms of both the 
physical movement of bodies and manner in which individuals understand their location in the 
space of society (although not necessarily their physical location) in terms of their relation to the 
norm. Our bodily potential is put into a complex relationship with the world, not as the result of 
direct force, but as a result of how we understand ourselves, others, and the space in which we 
exist. Our 'freedom' can, in this analysis, be understood as a function of these relationships and a 
mechanism by which they are furthered. 
Even outside of the prison or the school--those institutions in which our bodies come into 
direct contact with precise, cunning, and subtle methods which orient us into a specific relationship 
with the objects of the institutions--there exists relationships of power which produce a similar 
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result: a useful, compliant body and an equally compliant mind. I am arguing is that power 
relations in society create something of the order of a stable hierarchy of life trajectories in which 
the power relations which characterize a family, and institution or a society have the result of fixing 
the potential of a individual's life without recourse to direct coercion; in this analysis the potential 
for physical coercion implicit in the relationship between the individual and powerful institutions--
and other individuals or less powerful institutions--should be understood as last (although oft 
employed) recourse. Therefore, the amount of force required to stabilize society is indicative of the 
tensions within these power relations. Social stability, understood in this manner, results from of 
the creation of individuals, and life-trajectories, who understand themselves, others, politics, 
morality, and so on in a certain manner, and act accordingly. Furthermore, this is a phenomena of 
the current moment of history. 
Certainly, individuals in a Western democracy have the ability to make choices as to how 
they will organize their lives. There is, in addition, a severe scale or gradation operative in this 
ability to chose or act; thus certain individuals or groups have a great deal more leeway in their 
actions based on their race, class, sex, sexuality, etc. I am arguing here that these sets of choices, 
which come to define certain life trajectories--essentially what had been considered our 'freedom' 
in society--is strategic in that it is organized so as to assure the perpetuation of a particular social, 
political and economic order and thus this is an unfreedom. Furthermore, following the 
conclusions reached by Foucault, I am arguing that this unfreedom results from our implication in 
a 'primordial' network of power relations before it becomes a question of law, ethical choice, 
normative political judgment, etc. These power relations, though diffuse and specific, are tangible; 
they stem from a particular conjunction of body and world in the disciplinary mechanisms and in 
the context of, and related to, specific systems of knowledge and discursive practices. We exist in 
field, and this field is partially defined by power relations. However, one only has to look at the 
world to see that these power relations are not monolithic; there is resistance everywhere. 
I argued in part C of this chapter that Foucault saw the shift in definitions and applications 
of criminality in the context of particular movements in the political and economic spheres. The 
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current discussion should be understood in those terms as well. The fact that all individuals are 
subject, to varying degrees, to power relations should not lead one the conclusion that all 
individuals are equally subjugated. The idea of a life trajectory, I think, might provide a way out of 
this problem. It is apparent, when one looks at, for example, the class structures which 
characterize a capitalist society, that certain individuals are better off, so to speak, than others. The 
fact that Foucault identifies a link between the development of power relations and specific 
movements in the economic realm indicates that he was attentive to this problem. 
If one understand power relations, to which all individuals are subject, and societal 
structures, such as class, to be linked, then one can understand the apparent dichotomy which 
exists between a thesis of equal implication in power relations and unequal status in terms of 
'power' in the traditional sense (i.e., the power of control of the State or the means of production). 
For example, a capitalist society requires, as I think Foucault recognized with Marx, an unequal 
distribution of 'power' in terms of the control of the means of production and individuals who 
understand their roles in the machinery of production in a specific manner. If power relations are 
understood to be instrumental factors in the creation, for the individual, of a life trajectory within 
the normal, then power relations in an 'objectively' unequal society can be thought of as creating, 
as I argued above, a stable hierarchy of life trajectories. If this life trajectory within the normal is 
understood to be a labyrinth, which I think is useful for reasons pointed out in an earlier 
discussion, the inequality in distribution of control of the means of production (to take one 
example; another might be race or sexuality) can be visualized as a 'stack' or vertical arrangement 
of different labyrinths; one on top of the other so as to indicate the hierarchy in control of 
production. A capitalist society requires individuals who understand themselves as owners or 
capitalists and relate to the world and others as such as well as individuals who understand 
themselves as workers (or middle level management, to use a more appropriate contemporary 
example). Foucault consistently stressed the complexity of the relations of power and the 
mechanism and discourses to which they are indebted. This complexity ( of power relations and 
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their results or effects) must not be ignored--in fact this complexity must be explicitly addressed--
when considering the political implications of Foucault's work. 
I argued in the previous chapter that Foucault's work leads one to revise one's thinking 
about freedom. It does not, however, lead to set conclusions. Inherent in the work of Foucault is a 
tendency towards specificity on one hand and discontinuity on the other. By specificity I refer to 
his argument about the localized, diffuse, multiplicity of mechanisms in society which lead to our 
constitution and subjugation. Each particular mechanism or method must be grasped in itself and in 
its relation to the whole; that is, in terms of the role it plays in the overall stability or instability of a 
social order through the subjugation and classification of individuals and through the relationship 
between subjugating subjectivities and the institutional structures which characterize a society. In 
the case of punishment, the role the new mechanisms of discipline recreate criminality and define 
normalacy. 
By discontinuity I refer to the scattered character of discipline. Much as each characteristic 
element of society is specific in its orientation and result, there does not appear to be an overall 
mechanism which is infused with the modality of power to which Foucault refers. The stability of 
the State or the ruling class which controls the State, for example, is not only the result of the 
overwhelming force of the State or the ruling classes control over the mechanisms of the State, but 
the strategic location of the State apparatus and the ruling class in relation to the mechanisms of 
discipline, some of which are directly part of the State and some of which are related to other 
institutions, like the family or capital. This discussion is not an attempt to identify, isolate and 
theorize every specific mechanism or practice which affects the potentially free individual. Rather it 
is an attempt to understand, at the generalized level of disciplinary mechanisms what it is about the 
relationship between individual and world/mechanism that might allow for a free individual to 
come into being. 
As I have stated before, it seems that Foucault, while providing a framework from which to 
begin the discussion in that he has shown the clockwork mechanism of disciplinary institutions and 
has suggested the spread of those institutions to a general societal level does not provide a coherent 
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explanation of why individuals resist the panoptic machine. That is, to return to my plastic 
labyrinth, he cannot explain why we would take a wrong turn and bump our noses; he cannot 
explain what would lead an individual to see his or her very individuality or subjectivity as being 
subjugating in itself. However, before I leave Foucault to examine the work of Merleau-Ponty, 
whose work can, I would argue, provide some explanation as to why individuals resist the 
machinery of power, I want to turn briefly to some statements Foucault made about freedom and 
liberty. 
E. Foucault on Freedom 
In an late interview with Paul Rabinow published in the Foucault Reader, Foucault makes 
some interesting, though somewhat obscure, daims about both the qualities of space and its 
relation to what might constitute liberty. In response to a question about 'utopian schemes', he 
states: 
Men have dreamed of liberating machines. But there are no machines of freedom, 
by definition. This is not to say that the exercise of freedom is completely 
indifferent to spatial distribution, but it can only function when there is a certain 
convergence ... [between spatial distributions and the exercise of freedom] (FR, p. 
247). 
This statement is preceded by a response to a question concerning the liberating effects of 
architectural projects, to which Foucault replied: "I do not think that it is possible to say that one 
thing is of the order of 'liberation' and another is of the order of 'oppression' ... no matter how 
terrifying a system may be, there always remains the possibility of resistance, disobedience, and 
oppositional groupings" (FR, p. 245). Thus in Foucault, surprisingly, one can see an affinity 
(although one which is remote at best) with the Sartrean argument than the slave in chains can still 
be free. What defines liberty or freedom then? Foucault, at this point in his thinking, does not 
"think that there is anything that is functionally--by its very nature--absolutely liberating. Liberty is 
a practice" (FR, p. 245). Foucault's own view of freedom, though probably more complex than 
these statements illustrate, is of freedom as a mode of life; as an exercise: "'liberty' is what must be 
exercised" (FR, p. 245). For Foucault, and I think he's right on this point, there is no institution 
which is liberating in itself; freedom must be the result of practice. 
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A similar view of freedom is found in an interview, from a compilation of essays entitled 
The Final Foucault. conducted with Foucault shortly before his death, in which he defines "Liberty 
[as] the ontological condition of ethics" (FF, p. 4). That is, liberty is the practice of defining the 
mode of life, the ethics of life, in which we can, for example, "determine what is sexual pleasure .. 
.It seems to me that to use this ethical problem of the definition of practices of freedom is more 
important than the affirmation ... that sexuality or desire must be set free" (FF, p. 3). Foucault then 
proceeds to argue, in seeming contradiction to previous statements, that power relations can only 
exist "everywhere" if there is freedom everywhere (FF, p. 12). Foucault also makes some 
interesting links between the primordial levels of coercion involving the body and the creation of 
the soul and "states of domination" which characterize our society. I will return to this particular 
interview, and the conceptions of freedom and resistance put forth by Foucault within it, in the 
final chapter. 
For now, however, I have introduced these formulations to re-arrive at the question which 
I have made the point of much of this paper: "Why resist?" Foucault's own conclusions, though 
drawn from interviews and not systematically formulated, point towards an idea of freedom which 
view freedom as a practice, or a process. I will argue in the final chapter along similar lines, 
although from an angle which incorporates Merleau-Ponty's insights into the argument. The 
question remains, however, as to what creates the practice of freedom; what impetus 'frees' the 
body-subject from his or her subjection long enough to begin to formulate a practice of freedom? 
When does the individual become the seer and not the seen; that is, at what point does an individual 
come to an awareness of the power relations in which she or he is implicated? As I understand 
Foucault's arguments about power relations, there seems to be no way out. Within the work of 





The intention of this chapter, and the previous two chapters, is articulate a synthetic view of 
existence based on Merleau-Ponty and Foucault. If one follows Foucault in arguing that our 
politics, our freedom, is contingent upon relationships which take place on a subterranean level--
that is, which subject an individual to power--then one must understand, or at least make an 
attempt to understand, what sort of interactions and relationships constitute this primordial layer of 
existence. The previous chapter, then, stands as an explication of Foucault and the form taken by 
power relations: in short, how and why people are conformed. This chapter, as I understand it, 
stands as an attempt to explain the other side of this primordial, pre-reflective level of existence: 
why people resist. Or, more precisely, to understand why individuals might come to (a) view the 
norms and modes of living of their world as dominating or subjugating (if they in fact do) and (b) 
confront those norms; that is: resist. 
In order to discuss freedom, I first must make at least a provisional stab at looking at what 
sort of variables might organize our lives before the we even come to think about whether or not 
we are free. Hence all of this; hence the necessity of a discussion of power relations, the body, the 
world, etc. It doesn't seem like the stuff of political theory--have I mentioned rights, obligations, 
legitimacy, authority? No, because I am arguing that all of these concepts are to a certain extent 
contingent upon relationships which are in a sense invisible. These relationships are invisible 
because they are of the realm Merleau-Ponty called the "pre-reflective" and are based upon the 
relationships Foucault gave the title "the micro-physics of power". However, the 'invisibility' 
these relationships does not necessarily mean they are inevitable; as I will argue below (in the 
section entitled "The Tacit Cogito ), there is an interplay between the primordial and the reflective, 
which conditions both the possibility of domination and freedom. 
As such, this chapter will have a number of goals. First, I intend to explicate how Merleau-
Ponty viewed existence in terms of the lived body. To do that, it seems necessary to put these 
conceptions into the larger context of his work. Merleau-Ponty presents substantially different 
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difficulties as a theorist than does Foucault. Where Foucault was a thinker concerned with avoiding 
totalization and as a result did not draw certain conclusions from his work, Merleau-Ponty was a 
systematic thinker and intended to provide a coherent and comprehensive analysis of subjectivity; 
in short, an ontology and an epistemology articulated in a comprehensive view of existence. Thus 
the problem with Merleau-Ponty is not one of filling in the blanks, as it seems to be with Foucault, 
but rather one of deciding which aspects of his work are important to the question at hand. I have 
chosen to focus on certain of his ontological and epistemological arguments, rather than on, for 
example, his specific ideas of freedom or inter-subjectivity which stem from these arguments. Not 
because I necessarily disagree with his conclusions about freedom or inter-subjectivity, but 
because the arguments considered below are more relevant to the project of this essay. 
It is important to understand that the Phenomenolo~y of Perception was written primarily 
as a refutation of the ideas of subjectivity and knowledge put forth by two forms of philosophical 
and scientific thought which Merleau-Ponty called intellectualism and empiricism. In the 
introduction to the Phenomenology, Merleau-Ponty states that: 
There are two ways of being mistaken about quality: one is to make it into an 
element of consciousness, when in fact it is an object for consciousness, to treat it 
as an incommunicable impression, whereas it always has a meaning; the other is to 
think that this meaning and this object, at the level of quality, are fully developed 
and determinate (PP, p. 5). 
Merleau-Ponty considers the intellectualist conception of knowledge, in which the object is 
manifested in the world as a function of consciousness and is known as such, and the empiricist 
conception, in which the object is present in its totality in the world and can thus be apprehended 
and known in its totality as an object of knowledge, to be equally impoverished. In place of these 
conceptions, Merleau-Ponty wants to put forth a thesis which realizes that "the perceived, by its 
nature, admits of the ambiguous, the shifting, and is shaped by its context" (PP, p. 11). This is a 
key point of Merleau-Ponty's thought: the conception of the ambiguous. 
On the basis of this refutation, Merleau-Ponty articulated a non-dualistic ontology, in that 
he redefines the boundaries of the subject and object, or at least substantially blurs them. G.B. 
Madison argues that Merleau-Ponty's philosophical conclusions rest not so much on positive 
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assertions than on the conclusions which stem from his refutations.1 It seems that this is a valuable 
insight to keep in mind. However, it is also important to keep in mind that Merleau-Ponty did 
develop a theory which in a sense went beyond previous thought in that it questioned the status of 
the object and the subject and indeed the whole subject/object distinction generally (although his 
arguments were not without precedent, in the form of earlier phenomenology). By undermining the 
positions of intellectualism and empiricism, Merleau-Ponty, it seems, was led to conclusions 
which re-evaluated the possibility of the complete autonomy of the subject in knowledge projects 
and, most importantly for the argument of this essay, asserted the body as a lived body and a 
knowing body. I point this out to make it clear that there is more to Merleau-Ponty's philosophy 
than the portions of it upon which I have chosen to focus, and that the aspects on which I do focus 
must be understood in the context of his whole philosophy. 
Second, in this chapter I will support the argument concerning resistance articulated in the 
first chapter. That is, I will argue that Merleau-Ponty's thesis of the primacy of the body-world 
interaction in knowledge projects is useful in creating a framew~rk which understands resistance in 
terms of the play of relationships between the body as a knowing body, the world as a system of 
techniques and mechanisms which are reflected in a certain regime of power relations, those power 
relations themselves and the reflective life, or project, of the individual. That is, to briefly re-assert 
my argument, individuals come to resist the effects of the relations of power in which they are 
implicated as a result of the interplay between the body as a lived body and the world as 
constituted, pre-reflectively, by the mechanisms of discipline and reflectively by power relations 
and their effects. I thus follow Foucault to the extent that I see power as both producing 
compliance and resistance, but only when the relationship between the body and the world is 
understood in terms of the body as a lived, knowing body as Merleau-Ponty argued. Additionally, 
I hope in this chapter to offer some suggestions as to where Merleau-Ponty and Foucault coincide 
and diverge on different points; that is, I intend to take a look at the resemblance between the two 
1 Madison, G.B. "Did Merleau-Ponty have a Theory of Perception?" in Merleau-Ponty. Hermeneutics 
and Post-Modernity 
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theorists. Although this possibility seems remote at the outset, there are more points of similarity 
between Foucault and Merleau-Ponty than one might imagine. 
B. The Sensible and the Sentient 
Merleau-Ponty's critique of empiricism and intellectualism is organized, as I pointed out 
above, around a critique of how both modes of thought understand the relationship between a 
thinking, knowing subject and all the things, or objects of thought, of the world which might be 
known. Merleau-Ponty argues that both modes of thought misrepresent the interaction between the 
subject, with a body, and the object or thing. He bases much of his critique of the intellectualist 
and empiricist positions by pointing out their inability to explain the experience of a subject in the 
world; for example, the problems of perceptual synthesis and cognition experienced by a patient 
who has undergone significant physical injury to the brain. I will not go into his arguments here; 
that is not my problematic. Rather I want to point out the conclusions he draws from his critique 
and establish the context of the conclusions he makes. 
Merleau-Ponty argues that the thing and the world are "given to me along with the parts of 
my own body .. .in a living connection comparable, or rather identical, with that existing between 
the parts of my body itself" (PP, p. 205). That is, the physical structures and potentialities--
grasping, sight, touch, movement--of the body are articulated with the world; its being and the 
being of the body-subject are intermingled: thus "the sensible and the sentient do not stand in 
relation to each other as two mutually external terms ... " (PP, p. 214 ). The world does not 
provide a bombardment of sensation which a consciousness evaluates, or knows. Rather, the body 
and the world are joined, in a sense intertwined, and sensation must be understood in the context 
of that relationship. And, furthermore, each sensation "pre-supposes in me sediments left behind 
by some previous constitutions .. .I am ... a hollow, a fold [in being] which has been made and 
which can be unmade" (PP, p. 215). 
There are some revealing conclusions in these passages. Merleau-Ponty is arguing against 
the constancy of the sentient/sensible relationship as understood by thought which pre-supposes a 
pure subject/object distinction. That is, the subject can no longer be understood as a data-bank and 
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processor, which receives sensation from an objective world and processes these data as a 
knowing mind or as a consciousness which constitutes the world to be known. For Merleau-Ponty 
"every sensation takes place in an atmosphere of generality and is presented to us anonymously" 
(PP, p. 215). In terms of the purely sensible, we do not choose to see, feel or touch; this is an 
experience anterior to what has been called 'subjectivity': "I can see blue because I am sensitive to 
colors, whereas personal acts create a situation: I am a mathematician because I have decided to be 
one" (PP, p. 215). 
Thus rather than the perception of the world being a result of consciousness, it is 
perception as a pre-objective modality of existence which pre-figures the potential of 
consciousness. Fundamentally, it is the body as a lived body and as a knowing body which pre-
figures the "style" of existence taken by a given subject. The subjit is no longer free of the world: 
he or she can be made or unmade; that is, understanding of the world is subject to both re-
evaluation through time and the sedimentary remnants of all previous experience. To re-assert my 
point: as Merleau-Ponty understand it, we are not "in Hegel's phrase, 'a hole in being"' but, as 
pointed out before, a fold or a hollow (PP, p. 215). Thus we cannot peer out from this 
hypothetical hole, observing objects and others as if they existed apart from us. Our being and the 
world's being are implicated in one another: what we experience and think is always linked to 
previous thought and experience. 
The Merleau-Pontian subject, like the Foucaultian subject, is finite (in that it is not 
autonomous) and contingent (in that it is historical). Merleau-Ponty's refutation of autonomous 
subjectivity, however, stems from a different perspective. Foucault argued that the subject who 
thinks and knows does so in a particular regime of power relations and discursive possibilities; his 
or her knowledge projects are always contingent upon these variables, and thus his or her freedom 
has certain specific boundaries2 Merleau-Ponty refutes the possibility of a subject outside of the 
world, or a subject outside of the body, and thus although his conclusions are drawn from sources 
2 For Foucault's thought on this in relation to politics see "Politics and the Study of Discourse" in The 
Foucault Effect. In this essay he explains the relation between his conception of discourse, the 
impossibility of an autonomous subject, and the potential for a "progressive" politics. 
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and pre-suppositions which are radically different than those of Foucault, he arrives at a conclusion 
which seems to be of the same genus, or at least the same family. Merleau-Ponty intends to 
"rediscover, as anterior to the ideas of subject and object, the fact of my subjectivity and the 
nascent object, that primordial layer at which both things and ideas come into being" (PP, p. 219). 
Thus Merleau-Ponty sees the subject/object distinction as secondary relationship; a relationship 
produced by the process of reflection, rather than the ultimate determining factor of subjectivity. 
He states: "we have seen that primary perception is a non-thetic, pre-objective and pre-conscious 
experience" and it is this primary perception which conditions our thought (PP, p. 242). 
Merleau-Ponty intended his philosophy, I think, to articulate a way of looking at 
subjectivity and knowledge which would make a notion of truth and Unity of being coherent. He is 
attempting, I think, to go behind as well as around other ideas of subjectivity, not only to refute 
them, but to explain the relationships which organize the manifestation of other ideas of 
subjectivity in discourse. However, this analysis must--for the purposes of this essay--understand 
that the encounter with the world does not result in the same 'reality' for different subjects. Each 
subject's location and orientation (culturally, economically, politically, physically, etc.) toward the 
world is different and thus each subject's project toward the world presents him or her with a 
'different' (although potentially similar) lived reality. Merleau-Ponty argues that all individual's 
lives are characterized by a synthetic process involving a pre-reflective encounter of the world and 
a reflective project toward the world; these encounters or projects re-enforce each other and thus 
the end result (the lived reality of the subject and the knowledges which characterize that reality) 
stems from neither exclusively. This 'totalizing' process produces for each subject a total, full lived 
reality: a 'style' of existence. However I would argue that since each subject's encounter with the 
world begins from a different perspective, the 'reality' of different subjects might be significantly 
different. Foucault's relations of power, in addition, add another variable to the picture. However, 
this multiplicity of diverse, situated and localized experiences all begin with the experience, pre-
reflectively, of being a body in the world. 
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How does this relate to Foucault? On one level, both Merleau-Ponty and Foucault saw the 
reflective reality of the subject--the reality in which the subject resists and thus might become free--
as being related intrinsically to a set of subterranean relationships involving, among other things, 
the body. Thus to a certain degree both Merleau-Ponty and Foucault understand the world in terms 
of a set of spaces, objects, practices, mechanisms, etc. which, through the mediation of the body, 
influence the reflection of a subject. For Foucault, that layer is characterized by a network of 
techniques, arrangements of spaces and objects, and practices which, in a sense, grab hold of the 
body and invest it, subdue it by suspending the subject in a field of power relationships. These 
relationships, coupled with the discursive projects which surround us, create the individual. 
Merleau-Ponty, on the other hand, saw in this primordial layer a lived body which strives toward 
the world, through perception and the experience of the things and phenomena of the world, and 
thus embraces the world as the world simultaneously embraces the bcxly. Thus, I am arguing that 
both Merleau-Ponty and Foucault saw a dimension of primordial existence. As the world envelops 
the body in political field, a "political technology", the bcxly reaches toward the world through 
perception. In a sense, they collide, producing docility or resistance. 
Merleau-Ponty re-figures the subject/object dualism in a manner which accords to the bcxly 
somewhat of a 'subject-like' character. That is, Merleau-Ponty recognizes in the body 
intentionality: a striving toward the world through perception. This is substantially different, I 
would argue, from how Foucault characterizes the body in Discipline and Punish. For Foucault, 
the body is a thing with forces, uses, and capabilities which are harnessed by the techniques of 
disciplinary power. The body is something to be "occupied" by a soul, which then brings it to life; 
which provides a potential human with his or her "humanity". There is nothing about the 
Foucaultian body, as it is theorized in Discipline and Punish, which explicitly distinguishes it from 
an organic machine occupied by a constructed subjectivity.3 It cannot be coherently argued that 
3 As was seen in the previous chapter, it is the soul of the individual which brings him or her to life, 
according to Foucault. Our bodies, thus understood, are in a sense 'turned on' by the creation, through the 
realtions of power, of a subjectivity which "occupies" the body. This is what I mean when I refer to the 
Foucaultian body as an 'organic machine'. 
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Foucault remains stuck in some traditional subject/object or mind/body distinction. However, I will 
argue that Merleau-Ponty's conception of the "lived body" provides a more plausible and useful 
framework from which to understand the Foucaultian conception of the interaction between the 
power relations which invest an individual through his or her body and resistance to the effects of 
these relations. 
Here are the beginnings of the argument. Merleau Ponty saw experience as 
"communication of a finite subject with an opaque being from which it emerges but to which it 
remains committed" (PP, p. 219). The reflective understanding of a situation, in this schema, is 
based not on a subject's ability to get away from the situation and observe it objectively, but rather 
is based on--and, importantly, will always be based on--the inherence of a subject in a particular 
situation; or, the inherence of the subject in the world, with the body as "our general medium for 
having a world" (PP, p. 146). The Foucaultian subject, as well, cannot "get away" from a 
situation--the situation creates what is understood as subjectivity. As will be observed below in 
section C, this pre-reflective experience of a world does not necessarily coincide with the 'reality' 
of a reflective subject. Does this seem like a disadvantage? If we are perpetually stuck in our 
situation, if we cannot climb somewhere in order to establish some objective position from which 
we can see clearly, then how can we know whether or not we are free, especially if we are subject 
to power relations in a Foucaultian sense? How can we come to grips with the subjugating 
character of our subjectivity? From what stuff do we formulate, for example, a practice of 
freedom, or qualitative political judgments, or even simple truths about the world? The answers to 
these questions, I hope, rest in Merleau-Ponty's analysis of the manner in which we are stuck in 
the world; in his picture of this 'primordial layer'. 
C. The Body in the World 
We have already seen something of Merleau-Ponty's idea of the body. The body, 
according to Merleau-Ponty, is our means of having a world, our source of cultural expression, 
and ultimately, our subjectivity. But, importantly, Merleau-Ponty does not understand this 
relationship deterministically, as, for example, socio-biology does. Rather "everything is both 
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natural and cultural in man" (PP, p. 189). Our reflective existence is in some ways dependent on 
the relationship between our body and the world, but this relationship is defined by possibility, 
rather than by instinct: "the use a man is to make of his body is transcendent in relation to that body 
as a mere biological being" (PP, p. 189). The addition of Foucault to this -picture adds another 
significant dimension: the use of the body in the various machines of discipline and the 
consequences of that relationship in terms of discursive knowledge, the self understanding of the 
subject, and most importantly, resistance. This must be kept in mind in order to understand how 
we exists as bodies in the world. 
The experience of space by the reflecting subject, both in terms of external space and the 
space of the body, is linked to the experience of being first a body in the world; the body is the 
point of existence around which, for Merleau-Ponty, the experience of space is organized in terms 
of what is up, down, depth, etc.: these categories "pre-suppose the same setting face to face of 
subject and world" (PP, p. 265). All evidence, for Merleau-Ponty " ... throws us back to the 
organic relationship between subject and space, to that gearing of the subject to his world which is 
the origin of space" (PP, p. 251). This experience of space is related to the body as a perceiving 
body; to the body as a complex field of presence--complex in that it contains the things and spaces 
of the world as such and the things and spaces of the world in terms of the possibility of movement 
toward those things through the movement of time. That is, space is organized around the body not 
only as a consistent arrangement of things and the gaps between things; but as a field in which the 
body can move toward things, grasp them, etc.; furthermore, the " ... coexistence [ of, for 
example, the body and any given object], which in fact defines space, is not alien to time, but is the 
fact of two phenomena· belonging to the same temporal wave" (PP, p. 265). 
The perception of objective space by the thinking subject is related to the pre-objective 
inherence of the body in the world: "its modalities are always an expression of the total life of the 
subject, the energy with which he tends toward a future through his body and the his world" (PP, 
p. 283). For example, the "lamp" I see in the distance is also a possible past and a potential future; 
its relationship to a subject must be thought of not in terms of the objective distance between it and 
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the subject, but rather in terms of the tendency of a subject's body toward it. Thus space in not a 
pure objective state for Merleau-Ponty--it has dimensions of time and possibility. He argues that: 
"My body ... the system of anonymous functions which draw every particular focus into a general 
project. .. endows every subsequent perception of space with its meaning, and it is resumed at 
every instant. Space and perception generally represent. .. a communication with the world more 
ancient than thought" (PP, p. 254). For Merleau-Ponty "the gaze is that perceptual genius 
underlying the thinking subject which can give things the precise reply that they are awaiting in 
order to exist before us" (PP, p. 264). 
A more coherent and useful elucidation of this problem is provided in the third chapter of 
the Phenomenolo~y: "The Spatiality of Ones Own Body and Motility." In presenting the case of a 
'pathological' subject unable to perform certain movements and by showing how this example 
cannot be explained by either the intellectualist or the empiricist position, Merleau-Ponty offers a 
new explanation of the movement through space of one's own body. His discussion involves the 
c;ise of a patient unable to perform certain motions involving a conceptual framework. For 
example, the patient in question cannot grasp a certain part of his body if instructed, but is 
physically capable of performing the movement if, for example, that part of his body is 'stung' by 
a mosquito. Merleau-Ponty is able to explain this movement--the movement of the patient's body 
toward himself as a thing and toward the sting/mosquito as the world--by developing a distinction 
between phenomenal and objective movement. He states that: 
It is never our objective body that we move, but our phenomenal body, and there is 
no mystery in that, since our body, as the potentiality of this or that part of the 
world, surges toward objects to be grasped and perceives them (PP, p. 106) 
The ability of the subject in question to slap away a mosquito is explained because it takes 
place in the realm of the pre-objective; it is a function of the body's striving toward the world, its 
questioning of the world, and its responses to the answers the world provides--the mosquito, thus 
understood, is one of the worlds questions on a microscopic level. The subject is unable to 
conceive of and execute this particular motion, because the area of his brain responsible for the 
cognitive aspect of motion has been damaged. Yet the patient has not lost his primordial bodily 
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potential: he is still capable of moving his arm to slap the mosquito. The patient's body in this 
example still moves in the realm of the subterranean. His hand reaches out to grasp his body~-
without him thinking of it; if fact he cannot conceive of this motion, but he can perform it This 
represents the potential of the bcxly, and this is what Foucault has ignored. 
This example must, I think, be taken generally. That is, it must be expanded, as Merleau-
Ponty does, to an expression of a general relationship between the body and its parts, and the bcxly 
and the world. Thus to understand space--and the movement of the bcxly through space toward the 
world as a set of "unfinished" things--as Merleau-Ponty does, both in terms of the body's own 
spatiality and the body's interaction with the spaces of the world, one must understand it first in 
terms of a body which questions the world as a function of its existence as a field of presence and 
potentiality, which provides a basis for reflective conceptions of the world. And what of the 
individual subject to power? Can one consider the creation of a subjectivity through the effects of 
power as analogous to the destruction of a portion of the cognitive capacity of the brain, if only in 
the context of its effect Merleau-Ponty's primordial layer of existence? There is another dimension 
to space in Merleau-Ponty which might clarify this argument. 
Merleau-Ponty outlines a portion of the relationship between the pre-objective or perceptual 
experience of space and reflective experience of space in the following passage: "Our body and our 
perception always summons us to take as the center of the world that environment with which they 
present us. But this environment is not necessarily that of our life" (PP, p. 286). Thus the bodily 
experience of space, and of the world in general, is the stuff from which our thinking about space 
is drawn; the body is an infinite questioning of the world and the world an equally infinite set of 
answers, yet the lived, reflective experience of space and fundamentally of the world in general, 
although based on this pre-objective interaction, does not necessarily reflect the experience of the 
subterranean: "I never live wholly in the varieties of human space, but I am always ultimately 
rooted in a natural and non-human space" (p. 293). There is, however, a dialectic of sorts 
operative between reflective and pre-reflective life in Merleau-Ponty's arguments (this relation will 
be elucidated further below, in the section entitled "The Tacit Cogito"). That is, pre-reflective 
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experience is conditioned by the reflective orientation of the bcxly to the world (and vice-versa) in a 
continual and repeating process. However, the point I was attempting to make above is only that 
the world of reflection does not necessarily reflect each aspect of the body's encounter with the 
world. 
How are we to take these conclusions-? For Merleau;.Ponty "lived space" cannot 
necessarily be equated with space as the body apprehends it pre-reflectively: "Besides the physical 
and geometrical distance which stands between myself and all things, a 'lived' distance binds me to 
things which count and exist for me. This distance measures the scope of my life at every moment" 
(PP, p. 286). The experience of schizophrenia, Merleau-Ponty argues, is an experience in which 
this lived distance has become to small: "The shrinkage of lived space, which leaves no margin for 
the patient, leaves no room for chance (PP, p. 286). The schizophrenic patient, says Merleau-
Ponty, experiences space outside of the realms of geometry; in other words, he or she experiences 
space as meaningful. Or, when lived distance is both too small and to great, that which is far away 
"cease to count for me" while that which is to close, those events (or people, or spaces, or 
practices?) which obsess an individual "enshroud me like the night and r9b me of my individuality 
and freedom. I can literally no longer breathe; I am possessed" (PP, p. 286).3 Merleau-Ponty is 
speaking here, I think, of reflective experience of space cut off from the experience of a lived bcxly; 
it is a pathological condition, an anomaly of existence. Could one also argue, however, that the 
experience of an individual subject to power relations resembles such a 'pathology' in that the link 
between the given and the possible has been severed by forces outside (and inside) of the 
individual? 
The point to be made here is this: according to Merleau-Ponty, the world is experienced by 
the body as an open situation; reflective existence constitutes for the subject a situation as well, 
upon which, according to Merleau-Ponty, the subject can act. Following Foucault, one might 
argue that the reflecting subject lives in the world and understands it, at times, as a closed situation; 
that is, the lived reality of a subject embedded in a regime of power relations is in a sense restricted; 
3 Merleau-Ponty here is paraphrasing Ludwig Binswanger in Uber Ideenfluct, pp. 78 
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what can be said to be true, what is good, what we dQ with our lives and so on are all dependent 
on the relations of power and knowledge. In other words, as the schizophrenic patient lives in a 
different world than the 'normal' patient, the criminal of the modern age, in a sense, lives in a 
different world than the criminal of the eighteenth century. Can one see something here resembling 
an argument, and something in the above discussion of resistance? That is, can one see the link 
between the body as a knowing bcxly and power relations which at once control the body and the 
subjective life of the individual who is that body and thus the possibility of resistance? 
The things of the world have already been encountered in this discussion in terms of the 
interaction, though time and space, of the body with itself and the things of the world (i.e., in the 
discussion of the pathological subject). According to Merleau-Ponty: "I have the world as an 
incomplete individual, through the agency of my body as the potentiality of this world ... my body 
is a movement toward the world" (PP, p. 350). My body is the potentiality of the world because 
the world offers itself to the body through perception, and the subject who attempts to understand a 
'world' does so in terms of his or her bodies interaction with that world. But the world--
understood as that which is accessible first the body through perception--perpetually transcends the 
body's intentions, thus creating a project of the body toward the world. This project, for Merleau-
Ponty, is also understood in terms of the reflective life of the subject (this notion will be expanded 
upon in my discussion of the tacit cogito). 
It is important to the argument of this essay to understand, following Merleau-Ponty, that 
the body--as the "third genus of being" between the world of things and the thinking or reflective 
subject--encounters the world, pre-reflectively, not as an object, but as a living entity. Merleau-
Ponty describes our experience of the world by the body as follows: "The world, in the full sense 
of the word, is not an object. .. the world is a living, self-subsistent entity outside me" (PP, p. 
333). For Merleau-Ponty "whereas when I perceive, I belong, through my points of view, to the 
world as a whole ... [and I am not] ... aware of the limits of my visual field" (PP, p. 329). 
However, these limits exist, and thus the world (and its things) cannot be understood as an object, 
as a thing "in-itself' whose qualities are transparent to the reflecting subject. The key to perception 
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is the fact of the body's communion with the world--the assimilation of the world's things, spaces, 
etc. by the body. This primordial communion is facilitated both by the body--understood as a 
lived, phenomenal, perceiving body--and by the world as an 'incomplete individual' or a set of 
receding horizons. The fundamental point to be made is this: the world cannot be conceived of as 
an object, in terms of the pre-reflective experience of the world by the body and the body by the 
world, thus "In so far as I have hands, feet, a body, I sustain around me intentions which are not 
dependent upon my decisions and which affect my surroundings in a way which I do not choose" 
(PP, p. 440). 
D. Resistance ,,,. 
And what if our world, with its spaces, things, practices, and others, is riddled with 
networks of power relations, whose specific, original point of application is the lived body? 
Foucault sees in the configuration of the world a political technology, which takes the body as an 
amalgam of forces to be arranged, controlled, put to use. The body, understood as a lived body, is 
thus 'attacked' by the same world toward which it strives. I am arguing that our pre-thetic intention 
toward the world--in the form taken by our existence as a lived body through our perceptual 
interrogation of the world--is disrupted by the body's existence in a field of power relations, 
because those relations are addressed to the body; to the pre-reflective subject. It is in the 
materiality of the mechanisms of power--and thus in the link between the material relation of body 
and world and the knowledge relations which accompany this interaction, stem from it and provide 
the 'power' in power relations--that one can look for a tension which might make resistance 
possible--as deviance, abnormality and freedom are possible (and observable). That is, it is in the 
body understood as being at once the point at which power is applied to the soul and a potential 
source of knowledge about the world that one can look for a tension which might be the key to 
resistance. 
Power invests the body, but it is the soul of the reflective individual which is subject, in the 
strongest sense of the word, to power. Reflection, in the final analysis, is the key to Foucault's 
relations of power; again: "the soul is the prison of the body" but it is the body which allows the 
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soul to resists its constitution. I am arguing that power relations have the effect of breaking the 
simultaneous field of presence that the world is to the body and the body is to the world into a 
number of separate plots, only one of which pre-figures the lived reality of the subject. The world, 
to the body, is a open, continuous horizon into which the body can slip and which the body 
attempts to grasp through perception, movement and time--this is the constant variable in the set of 
contingent relationships I am attempting to describe. The body would have the world as an 'open' 
field. The application of specific, strategic forces to the body creates for us a subjectivity which can 
be known and thus subjugated; for the subject a lived reality is born, a world. The reflective 
understanding of this reality by the subject orients the subject toward the world in a particular 
manner--and thus orients the body toward the world. The tension to which I think resistance might 
be linked arises in the conflict between the body as a lived body, as a body which is a source of 
knowledge, and the relations of power which create a specific reality, in part, through the 
manipulation of the body. Importantly, there is no 'original' state of being here: what I am 
attempting to describe must be understood as being a process, or a dialectic. Furthermore, it is a 
tension, as opposed to an even or a cause--thus there is no inevitability or necessity operative here, 
only possibility. 
In short, the existence of power relations in the world can be seen as another aspect of the 
interrogative relationship between the world and the body. In this case both the questions and 
answers are provided, so to speak, by the world. The tension I spoke of above lies in the fact that, 
as I understand Foucault, there is nothing in the relations of power which removes from the body 
this interrogative function. It is more useful, I think, to understand power relations as a sort of 
short circuit--one which operate by providing 'answers' to the reflective subject through the 
complex relationship between world, body, subject and the penalty of crossing the norm which 
constitute disciplinary power--of the body world communion. 
That is, the real "power" in the relationship in which the subject is placed in fact comes 
from the implication of the subject in the perpetuation of power relations; that is, the 'role' of the 
subject in power relations. The lived body, as a project toward the world, is in a sense confused 
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when a divergence is present between 'its' project and the lived reality--the set or field of 
relationships by which a subjectivity understands the world and itself as a subject--which stems 
from power relations. The presence of a tension between the body and the world as a system of 
power relations can enter, I would argue, into the lived reality of a subject; this might potentially 
lead to another tension which is not necessarily realized consciously but which can potentially 
orient the trajectory of the subject's life in a manner which replicates the original bcxly--world 
tension, thus creating further possibilities, other horizons, additional tensions. 
This analysis seems difficult to stomach. Does this make any sense? Can these 
descriptions, which seem abstract and vague, have any relevance to actual experience, and if they 
do, what relevance to a discussion of freedom does this have? Two things might help to make the 
argument more coherent. First, reconsider for a moment the example of the 'pathological' subject 
discussed above. The subject in question could not conceive of a particular interaction--a set of 
movements--between himself and his own body (his arm and hand and the portion of his body 
which he was instructed to touch) and himself and the world (pointing at certain objects, which 
was not delt with above but which Merleau-Ponty outlines in his discussion). The possibility of a 
specific lived reality, in which this subject could grasp objects or touch parts of his bcxly through 
conscious choice, was inaccessible to him. Yet the body of this subject retained a primordial 
intention toward the world which allowed him to complete the motion or motions, if the world--in 
the form of the sting of a mosquito--questioned his body through the sting of a mosquito. 
This, I would argue, can be seen as analogous, but not equivalent, to the body's existence 
in a field of power relations. The body, subject to these specific technologies, is manipulated by 
the particular configuration of the world--understood not only as things, but practices, visibility, 
even culture--with specific results: the creation of a lived reality for the subject of power and the 
creation of a useful, but not incapable, body. It is within this lived reality and by its terms that the 
subject understands him/herself to be free, normal, an individual, etc. The body's insertion into a 
specific regime of power relations, although the relationship stemmed originally from a subtle and 
diffuse application of power to the body, creates a conscious relationship, a relationship known to 
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the reflecting subject, between the body, and the subject, and the things and spaces of the world. 
Any given individual understands, for example, certain spaces to be off-limits or a certain stance as 
appropriate for a soldier, not because of a physical inability to enter those spaces or to assume a 
different stance, but because the subject, consciously or unconsciously, is aware of the penalties 
which accompany deviance. 
I am arguing that there is an analogy present here because in both cases, the specific case of 
the pathological subject and the general case I am attempting to describe, the boundaries set on the 
lived reality of the subject are boundaries set by the soul: the above subject cannot think a 
movement into reality, and the subject of power cannot, unless he or she resists, think or live 
another reality. In both cases, however, the body retains a grip on the world which allows the hand 
to respond to the sting and the subject, I am arguing, to resist. Much as the damage to his brain 
removed the above subject's ability to respond to the world consciously, the reflective subject is 
placed in a similar relationship to the world--as a whole--by relations of power: "we never live 
wholly in the varieties of human space." As Merleau-Ponty argues" ... the essential point is clearly 
to grasp the project toward the world that we are" (PP, p. 404). The questions of the world, raised 
to the body outside of thought, are not removed by power relations for the lived body, only for the 
reflective subject. Because the body retains this interrogative function, as the subject retained the 
ability to slap away the mosquito, the lived reality created by a subject's existence in variable 
regimes of power relations is not indestructible, free of change or conflict. The lived reality of the 
subject to power is constantly, I would argue, invaded by the pre-objective, and though each 
intrusion of possibility does not necessarily equal a moment of resistance each moment of tension 
can subtly alter the trajectory of the subject through the world. 
The second point of clarification, I think, re-enforces the first. Our existence is not 
comprised of a single, unrelated experiences, or single, unrelated perceptions of the world. 
Similarly, the mechanisms which comprise the political technology of the world acting on the 
body, the techniques and practices which attempt to break the body down into component parts, 
each of which can be utilized in a particular task, are, as Foucault argues, diffuse and non-
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systematic. In terms of an individual's existence in a society defined by certain norms and power 
relations, the field which defines power relations, which comprises the political technology which 
invests the body, might be better understood as a entire landscape, with variations and subtleties. 
When a body crosses a ridge in this field, its experience, what it sees and how it is seen, is 
different from the experience of a valley, and its view of the valley is different as well. We do not, 
that is, live in a prison; we live in a society which is comprised of many different elements, many 
specific networks of power relations, all of which leave room for slack and tension. 
It is in the temporal and variable nature of both the effects of power relations and the 
potential for knowledge which rests in the body as a lived body that one must look for resistance. 
My chance at understanding how I have come to be constituted as a subject, as a modem 
individual, does not rest in a single moment of conflict between my body as a lived body and the 
world as a system of power relations, but in series of linked moments created by this interaction. 
Resistance, I would argue, arises in a sort of dialectical play of forces. This is not a mechanical 
argument: resistance is in a sense dependent on the action of the subject; I have been arguing so far 
that existence is constituted by certain relations in existence which allows for this possibility. When 
the tension between body and world results in a moment of reflective questioning, a new base is 
provided, on a reflective level, which conditions the pre-reflective orientation of my existence as a 
lived-body. That is, the moment at which a question or a tension enters the mind of the subject 
immediately refigures both the project of the individual and, importantly, the body's orientation 
toward the world and thus provides a existential basis for additional questioning. Fundamentally, 
however, the tension originates in the relationship between a lived body as a knowing body and the 
power relations implicit in the configuration of the world. To clarify and extend this analysis, I will 
now turn to a discussion of the tacit cogito of Merleau-Ponty. 
E. The Tacit Cogito 
Merleau-Ponty's discussion of the cogito is centered around what he sees as faulty notions 
of subjectivity and knowledge, as is his entire discussion throughout the Phenomenolo~y. He 
argues that phenomenological reflection (on reflection, interestingly) refutes the possibility of the 
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Cartesian cogito, because the cogito thus understood neglects the relationship between body as a 
phenomenal body and the world which precedes any reflection, including the moment of thought 
about thought which previous philosophy understood as subjectivity itself (and which both 
Foucault and Merleau~Ponty reject). In place of this, Merleau-Ponty proposes, using as a base his 
analysis of the body and world relationship, a unspoken cogito: "behind the spoken cogito, the one 
which is converted into discourse and into essential truth, there lies a tacit cogito, myself 
experienced by myself' (PP, p. 403). The tacit cogito, argues Merleau-Ponty is "no less than 
existence" itself (PP, p. 404). 
The unspoken cogito "has upon itself and upon the world only a precarious hold .. .it 
divines the world around itself as a field not provided by itself. 11 (PP, p. 404 ). The hold is 
precarious; it is ambiguous; but it is radical in that it is primordial. The things of the world, the 
world itself, are transcendent in relation to the perceiving subject. That is, the world is a set of 
horizons: to give a specific example, a rock before me on a path transcends my immediate present. 
For my body, the rock cannot be an object because it evades all possibility of me grasping it in its 
totality. Furthermore, this ambiguity inherent in the world, and inherent in the tacit cogito, leads to 
further questioning, pre-reflectively by my body and also by the reflective subject. Yet although 
ambiguity defines subjectivity for Merleau-Ponty, the reflective existence of the subject is 
nonetheless prefigured by this primordial interaction, which is the tacit cogito. 
Merleau-Ponty argues that "The lived is certainly lived by me ... But I can experience more 
things than I represent to myself, and my being is not reducible to what expressly appears to me 
concerning myself. That which is merely lived is ambivalent. .. " (PP, p. 296). This is an 
interesting passage, for a number of reasons. According to Foucault, the merely lived could not be 
further from ambivalent: the merely lived is the realm of the mechanisms of power, what we are is 
determined by the merely lived, by it all the subtle and specific mechanisms. Yet Merleau-Ponty 
has not entirely missed the point here: the merely lived, whether ambivalent or not, is experienced 
by the body. We have, according to Merleau-Ponty, a "pre-conscious possession of a world, 11 
which is the new cogito. The world we possess, however, at every instant acts upon us to create a 
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lived reality which is not the whole of the world we experience as the "merely lived." The reflective 
reality it creates is created through the medium of the body, just as thought of a thought meet each 
other, for Merleau-Ponty "only in passing through the world" (PP, p. 298). When the body is 
understood as a lived body--a potentially knowing body--this power mediated meeting of body and 
world results in the primordial tension between the lived reality of the subject and the possible. 
Have I asserted this point enough? I will make it again, for good measure. 
It is important to understand that Merleau-Ponty was not relegating reflective existence to a 
mere effect of the tacit cogito. Rather the tacit cogito, as he understood it, and reflective existence 
exist in a dialectical relationship of sorts; that is, Merleau-Ponty restores to the cogito "the 
thickness of time." What I reflect on is, according to Merleau-Ponty, fundamentally linked to my 
being in the world as a subject with a lived or knowing body. Yet the realization of the tacit cogito, 
what in fact makes it a cogito for Merleau-Ponty, is its connection to the reflective world of the 
individual: "The tacit cogito is a cogito only when it has found expression for itself." (PP, p. 404). 
If the arrangement of the world is implicated in relations of power, then the reflective activity of the 
subject is limited by the nature of the soul which stems from these relations, following Foucault. 
The world of the individual subject to power relations thus is constrained by these relationships. 
Yet our body is still a "view of the world" and the world still presents itself as a transcendent being 
which asks the body, so to speak, to question it due to its very form as an "incomplete individual"; 
its transcendental nature. I am arguing that Foucault's conception of power relations and the body 
neglects the tacit cogito: we are subject to power, yet the tacit cogito remains as a pre-thetic 
modality of our existence. Resistance can come at that moment when there is a leakage between 
what is a 'lived reality' and what is a possibility; if as a result the subject sees the world and 
him/herself in 'a new light' then the subject at that moment has the potential to resist. This leakage 
must be understood to be a constant factor of existence and it must be understood as being related 
to the total project of the individual in the world (though not dependent upon that project as a 
cause). How do we have the world? This might, again, provide further coherency to the argument. 
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We have the world and the world has us: "The world is wholly inside and I am wholly 
outside myself." We do not think we are in the world, our thought of our inherence is in fact linked 
to the actuality of our bodies being in the world. The body interrogates a world that is not an 
object; the "unfinished" nature of the world allows asks for the interrogation and furthers it. Not 
only do power relations create a lived reality which is, it seems, only a fraction of the possible 
realities open to the body, but the material aspects of these relations, rather than creating a fully 
compliant body (or, more precisely, in the attempt to create a compliant body) create the possibility 
of additional questioning by interfering with the interrogative function of the lived body which is a 
key, according to Merleau-Ponty, to our very subjectivity. With an uncharacteristic lack of 
philosophical vocabulary, Merleau-Ponty states that "One day, once and for all, something was set 
in motion which, even during sleep, can no longer cease to see or not to see, to feel or not to feel, 
to suffer or be happy, to think or rest from thinking, in a word to 'have it out' with the 
world." (PP, p. 406-407, emphasis added). Our subjectivity is this "one single 'living cohesion"' 
which is time, the world, our bodies (PP, p. 407). Furthermore: 
My first perception, along with the horizons which surround it, is an ever-present 
event, an unforgettable tradition; even as a thinking subject, I still am my first 
perception, the continuation of that same life inaugurated by it. .. [I am] one single 
temporality which is engaged, from birth, in making itself progressively explicit, 
and in confirming that cohesion in each successive present ... [subjectivity can be 
understood as] the potentiality of something in the most general sense, which is the 
world's phantom. (PP, p. 407). 
The pursuit of the worlds phantom is dangerous, however; the world, as we live in it now, 
is full of traps and nets, into which the body and thus the subject falls; yet the body continuously 
disentangles itself from the traps. Merleau-Ponty does not fully acknowledge is the extent to which 
the world we pursue envelops us in relations which create for us a certain reality, which, in fact, 
create us; how this is strategic and subjugating, and not merely the result of our intentions, pre-
reflective or not. He does, however, argue that: 
We therefore recognize, around our initiatives and around that strictly individual 
project which is oneself, a zone of generalized existence and of projects already 
formed, significances which trail between ourselves and things and which confer 
upon us the quality of man, bourgeois or worker (PP, p. 450) 
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Within Merleau-Ponty one can see something which looks like social construction; this 
construction, however, is dependent in the final analysis on the freedom of the individual. 
Additionally, Merleau-Ponty's work is indebted to that of Marx. Thus his understanding of this 
'construction' reflects a knowledge that this construction is related to the specific economic, 
cultural and political forms which surround an individual and thus which can subjugate him or her. 
However, there is a significant difference between this notion of construction and that presented by 
Foucault. 
For example, according to Merleau-Ponty class consciousness is realized neither through 
the realization in the individual consciousness of the objective conditions which surround him or 
her (ala Marx) or through a pure act of will or a constituting consciousness (as Merleau-Ponty's 
"intellectualism" understand the problem). Rather one becomes consciousness of ones class 
position in relation to larger societal forces (like capital or the ruling class) when one grasps the 
possibilities offered by history and brings these possibilities into one's own project; one's 'style' 
of existence. Merleau-Ponty, therefore, understands subjectivity as that which is free, rather than 
that which is subjugating. Thus I feel justified, given Foucault's conclusions, in attributing to 
Merleau-Ponty a certain lack of recognition. Foucault's conclusions, however, are problematic as 
well. That is, as I have argued throughout this essay, he fails to recognize, or doesn't accept, the 
potentiality of the body striving toward the world as a set of different potentialities and horizons 
which leads to a tension in the system/field of the body and the world in communication with each 
other. The conversation which takes place, as a result, is heated; its clamor, at times, leaks into the 
lived reality of the subject. Importantly, as can be seen in the above passages, the body (and thus 
in a sense the subject) 'remembers' the conversation it has with the world--the results of its 
communion with the world--and this 'remembrance' is both what conforms us and leads us to 
resist. 
This tension can be captured in an example. Suppose for example, Merleau-Ponty's friend 
Paul and I sat gazing for a while at a particular changing landscape as if we were sitting in a 
moving train, watching the scenery pass us by ( or living a life full of different perceptions and 
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encounters with the world). The landscape we see is of the world: the world as a set of things, 
others and spaces, but also the world as culture, knowledge, language, etc. Paul sees in the 
landscape meaning; for him it is a space full of implications for his very being as a subject--what 
Paul understands Paul to be. Following Foucault, Paul's subjectivity--his soul--is contingent upon 
his existence in a certain regime or field of power relations and thus for Paul the space of the 
landscape might represent a threat to his existence; entry into that space might represent a break 
from the normal. But me, I just see the passing scenery in terms of a set of things and possibles 
toward which my body is oriented. The things within the landscape beckon to me in their 
ambiguity. I can see them, I can move toward them, and for me the experience of the landscape 
ends there. As such, Paul and I might disagree as to the character of this landscape (or, possibly, 
the character of our lives). Both Paul and I enter the space of the landscape through our bodies, 
through perception, as the world questions us. Our experience of this space are different--and this 
is the key to understanding this general gist of this argument--because in this example I have no 
'mind', no reflective existence. If Paul and I were to be made one living moving whole, as the 
lived body and the created soul are one in the subject as two overlapping aspects and not as two 
separate parts, the heat of our arguments (about the landscape or 'our' life) might be translated into 
the tension existing in pre-reflective existence, and within the soul of a subject. This tension must 
be understood to be the result of the play of relationships which pre-figure the reality open to the 
subject. These are the relations which, I think, can help us understand resistance and complicity. 
F. Resistance Understood Metaphorically 
' 
We can see,. for one instant or for a series of instants, how a body comes into contact with 
the world through perception. We can see how, as a result of this pre-reflective inherence in the 
world, a reflective subject's lived reality develops, changes, is synthesized. We can see how a 
body comes into contact with power through the body's implication in a political field, a field 
constituted by the world arranged into a system of spaces, techniques, methods, objects and 
knowledges. And we can see how this field, this technology of the body, produces compliant body 
and a useful individual, as well as a norm of what an "individual" is around which others are 
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arranged. We can see the possibility of divergence between these two primordial contacts, and thus 
see why a subject might, for an instant, dis-entangle him or herself from the field of power in 
which he or she is implicated. It is possible to describe abstractly a possible view of the entire 
process, as I have attempted to do above. But how can we see the specific elements of the overall 
process of resistance, the moments of understanding and loss of understanding, struggle and 
compliance, which might produce a compliant individual or one who resists? And thus how can 
we come to understand freedom? This process, it seems, escapes description. 
One can describe the momentary conjunction of body and world in a particular "political 
field" or in terms of a particular possibility of "perceptual synthesis" or "interrogation" but the 
overall process, it seems, eludes the capacities of descriptive analysis. I am arguing that a 
discussion of freedom necessitates an analysis of power and resistance. The complexity of any 
given individual's trajectory through a linked and inter-related series of situations, each with its 
own forms of power relations and different horizons of possibility--let alone the amalgam of 
different individuals within a family, a group, a culture, or a society--cannot be understood in 
terms of each specific instant; it must be understood as a general process. It is a process which 
begins with birth and it is constituted by the installation into our subjectivities of a tension. Any 
specific instant cannot be understood to represent this tension--it must be understood as the result 
of the overall process. It is helpful, in order to create a useful picture of how throughout the course 
of an individuals life, he or she can at once be subject to power and resist power and thus possibly 
formulate a practice of freedom, to approach the problem metaphorically.5 
Plate 10 of Discipline and Punish, entitled "Orthodpaedics or the art of preventing and 
correcting deformities of the body in children," provides a visual metaphor for the body, world, 
power relationship which might elucidate, given Foucault's conception power relations and 
Merleau-Ponty's thesis of the lived body, the possibility of resistance centered around the body. 
5 Donna Harraway, more or less, led me to the use of metaphor in this fashion. She proposes the use of 
technological metaphors for understanding the process of knowing in a manner which is at once 
attentive to the necessity of explaining 'reality' and the necessity of understanding the contingent and 
power-variable nature of knowing in "Situated Knowledges: Feminism and the Privelege of Partial 
Perspective", from Simians, Cyborgs and Women. 
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The picture is of a tree, with a slightly curving trunk, bound with a length of rope to a straight 
stake. The intention of the picture is, I think, to illustrate how certain physical techniques or 
practices can produce a living structure with a particular form. The rope and the stake, in this 
picture, are meant to guide the growth of the tree; to produce a straight trunk and thus a tree that is 
useful aesthetically or commercially, for example 
Foucault, I think, included this picture to illustrate the effects of the techniques and 
practices of discipline on the body, and to show how the knowledges of the time, in different 
discourses and fields, was implicated in discipline. The rope and the stake represent the political 
field in which the body is suspended; they are the network of methods, techniques, practices, 
regimes of training, etc. he saw as instrumental in the productions of docile bodies and a particular 
forms of individuals; as the rope circles and binds the tree to the stake, the relations of power circle 
and the body of the individual and bind the subject to the normal. To straighten the tree, by · 
conforming it to the force of-the rope and the stake, is equivalent to the production of a docile 
body--and a normal (e.g., straight and uniform) subject. Yet the tree is not clay or plastic; it is a 
living entity; it grows and strives upward toward the sun in order to further its life as the body, 
pre-reflectively, strives toward the world, interrogates it, and thus attempts to answer its questions. 
Without the conforming force of the rope and the stake, in time the tree could grow in many 
directions, with many curves, twists and subtleties to give it a unique character. 
Following Merleau-Ponty, the body is a striving toward the world through perception, 
movement, and time. It exists as a field whose scope is broader, in a sense, than the lived reality of 
the reflective subject. Importantly, in Plate 10 the tree has not yet been straightened; its trunk is still 
curved away from the stake, away from the normal: the growth of the tree, like the field of 
possibility that is the body, is in tension with the rope and the stake. The picture I am painting is 
one of two overlapping, conflicting fields: one a field of power relations, and one a field of bodily 
possibility. If this picture can be understood to represent the whole complex field of relationships 
which contribute to the construction of a subjectivity, the tension between the tree, the rope and the 
stake can be seen to represent the tension in subjectivity between complicity and resistance. The 
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tree, given time, will eventually be straightened. But power, I would argue, no matter what forces 
it applies the body or how it harnesses it capabilities, cannot ultimately remove the interrogation of 
the world which is the lived body nor the reflective project to which that interrogation contributes. 
That, it seems, would make resistance unknown; a glance at the world make that possibility 
untenable. 
What is at stake is not only a docile body or a straight tree, but a subjectivity or individual 
which might be free: the result of the body and the subject's suspension in a political field and in a 
regime of power relations and the result of the body's perceptual interrogation of the world is a 
potentially knowing subject. The tension at the primordial, pre-reflective level of power relations 
and the lived body is potentially replicated as a tension in a knowing, thinking subject: one which 
lives in the world of the normal, and which might live in the world of the free. According to 
Merleau-Ponty, all the possibilities of knowledge and reflective existence rest in this primordial 
world-body interaction. According to Foucault, all our possibilities of knowledge--especially, for 
the purposes of this essay, knowledge of our selves and how we relate to (a) those around us (b) 
the spaces in which live and move--are implicated in the communion of relations of power and 
discursive possibilities. Thus the body is only the beginning of the picture; what is really at stake in 
the interaction between the two fields--perceptual intentionality and power relations--is resistance. 
What allows the rope and the stake in Plate 10 to produce, to form, or to create a straight 
tree? This is a particularly appropriate metaphor, because within this picture the passage of time is 
implied. For the tree to become straight, it must be gradually conformed by the forces of the rope 
and the stake. The creation of individuals and the conformation of bodies to make useful the forces 
of the body, under a particular regime of power relations, is a function of the passage of time as 
well; in order for the forces of a body to be harnessed, it must be trained, organized into a 
particular articulation with objects; its specific forces and parts must be broken down and applied to 
certain tasks. This is what Foucault refers to as the "anatomo-chronological schema" of any 
particular discipline. The forces which define my behavior as deviant, criminal or abnormal are 
applied continuously and differentially to my body and mind through the entire course of my life. 
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Foucault's conception of power relations implies the passage of time and a continuous application 
of force; whereas the force, or the power, the State has over the individual, for example, is only 
exercised in precise instants: I am only arrested once, sentenced once, and put into prison once. 
As the tree grows and its form is altered (and as the subject exists as a trajectory through the world) 
the tension implicit in its relationship with the rope and the stake might grow as well. 
The created norm which puts my body in a particular orientation toward the world and 
others. This norm is the result of my body's existence in varying fields of power relations; these 
diffuse fields contain many topographical features, subtleties, areas of difference and varying 
intensity. But it is the body which allows the subject to either (1) alter this orientation through 
reflective action or (2) have it subtly altered through the pre-thetic intentionality of the body. Just as 
the particular mechanisms of power, which in themselves are more or less ineffectual, become part 
of a "political technology" when applied simultaneously, the interrogation of the world by the 
body, the conflict created between a lived body and the certain relations of power to which it is 
subject must be thought of in terms of overall effects. I do not remove myself from the political 
field when I enter a space considered abnormal or change the style of my handwriting, yet if all my 
subtle actions and pre-reflective perceptions are taken as a whole; if all my possible movements and 
the striving of my body and reflective re-orientations of the project are taken together, I might just 
begin to look at the world in a different light. It is because of the pre-reflective possibility inherent 
in my body that I can in fact resist, although each isolated incident by itself is meaningless. This is 
the tension I was attempting to capture in the description of the tree and the stake, a tension which 
exists in a world constituted by fields of power relations and pre-reflective, bodily presence. 
H. Back to Foucault 
In the last chapter I argued that power relations not only create a particular subjectivity, but 
in relation to the strategic role of larger social forces--a dominant class, the State, etc.--these 
relations create something of the order of a stable life trajectory for any given subject or 
set/hierarchy of life trajectories which perpetuates, as a result of how each created subjectivity 
understands him or herself in relation to these larger forces, the social order. To understand this, I 
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offered the metaphor of a clear, hard plastic labyrinth as this life trajectory. It is clear, because what 
is outside the normal and thus outside of the labyrinth, is visible, and it is a labyrinth, because, 
following Foucault, relations of power control by circulating the body into different, but specific, 
spaces rather than by fixing the individual physically in a particular location. 
How can this idea be related to the idea of tensional subjectivity I have attempted to develop 
out of the work of Merleau-Ponty? It is this tension, which originates in our body's relationship 
with the world and is thus replicated in our subjectivities, that can lead us to bump up against the 
plastic and thus attempt to grasp and alter both the trajectory of our lives through a grasping of our 
souls. Following Foucault, one can understand that the relationship between subjectivity and world 
is not simply a relation of cause and effect, but of strategy, purpose, and tactic. What must be 
clearly elucidated, in order to understand freedom, is how the 'nature' of our subjectivity is linked 
to the trajectory of our lives and the larger sets of social forces to which we are subject. In other 
words, what meaning can freedom have given the arguments I have offered so far? This is the 





Resistance in itself is not freedom. To be free one must first realize and understand that one 
is not free; freedom and resistance understood in this manner privileges the role of knowledge in a 
possible practice of freedom. This seems like a truism; it is an obvious and general statement which 
inspires neither refutation nor acceptance. However, what Foucault's work leads to is a conception 
of subjectivity--of human existence at this particular historical juncture in general--in which 
subjectivity itself is in a sense subjugating. His work leads one to conclude that what has been 
commonly thought of as impositions on some essential humanity is in fact 'humanity' itself. The 
thought of freedom thus understood becomes meaningless, because there is nothing to free; we are 
what we are, and our existence, our real subjectivity itself, is subject to the play of forces beyond 
our control. Our construction, furthermore, is 'real': that is, it is not illusory or the product of --
alienation or false consciousness. What I have attempted to show in the last chapter, however, is 
that phenomenological understanding of the lived body as a moment of our subjectivity in itself 
allows one to understand how resistance to our construction, and the norms around which it is 
organized, comes into being through the possibility of a tension arising in subjectivity; a tension 
which fundamentally is based on the possibility of seeing the world and thus seeing ourselves in j 
different ways. This chapter, then, is an attempt to sketch the general outlines of a theory of 
freedom which follows from the arguments (and the ideas of Foucault and Merleau-Ponty) 
provided in the previous three chapters. 
Construction implies the possibility of reconstruction; it does not necessitate it. however. 
An understanding of the power-dependence of the norms, values and systems of knowledge which 
organize our lives and through which we are constituted and constitute ourselves as subjectivities 
can provide us a chance at a reconstruction of our subjectivity. The knowledge of the subjugating 
character of construction requires, in order to freedom to have any meaning, an ability or a chance 
inherent within a subject to know something of and thus confront his or her unfreedom. That is, 
the subject must be understood as a point of confrontation; or, there must be something about the 
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construction of subjectivity which allows the subject agency. The above discussion was intended 
to show W~I"t?.~~~Q!!~h~2 __ ~!~~~n the body and the world which allows for this 
possibility; not to show, for example, that subjects or groups resist something. The evidence of 
The agency of the subject is neither eternal nor impossible; rather it is always threatened by 
the encroachments of the world. The most important threat, then, lies in the power relations to 
which the individual is subject. Resistance is in some ways, an act of agency, but agency cannot 
exist without a source: some primordial tension or chance at freedom. This chance, as I have 
attempted to describe it above, defines the possibility of freedom. The body is not the 'source' of 
this knowledge or tension; the tension is relational, like power itself. That is, it is the role played 
by the body as a lived body striving toward the world in a series of relationships, including power ...._____:_ ____ _;--- '----------
relationships, which leads to aJ§nsiog :It is in this tension, I would argue, that one can look to find 
the source of the series of moments or resistance and understanding, compliance and re-
u~ I would argue characterize what can be called a process of a practice of 
freedom. 
A notion of subjectivity seems to flow naturally from Foucault and Merleau-Ponty. They 
are different thinkers, certainly, but when elements of their work are juxtaposed a picture of a 
subject materializes. I would like to try to portray this subject before I move on to a more explicit 
discussion of freedom. It may seem that I have characterized, following Merleau-Ponty, existence 
in two parts: reflective and pre-reflective. However, I understand Merleau-Ponty to be arguing that 
these two parts of subjectivity are two aspects of a unity which is existence. The separation is only 
apparent; it is a function of the necessary separation of the language used to describe each aspect of 
existence as a whole. This, as I understand it, is also how Merleau-Ponty understands the 'subject' 
to be at once subject and object--to have qualities associated with the categories 'subject' and 





The subject in question can be understood as being at once a subject with a docile body and 
a phenomenal, lived body; at once subjugated and potentially free; at once a reflective thinker and a 
pre-reflective 'actor' (in terms of the body as a lived body). However, what we understand as our 
'body'; that is, we don't think our body to be part lived and part docile. Rather these are two 
aspects of our single body to us, as the categories subject and object are understood by Merleau-
Ponty to be two aspects or, in The Visible and the Invisible. two "leaves" of a unity which is our 
body or the unity of being which is body and world. The categories or elements of subjectivity, 
furthermore, overlap within the subject and are in communion--and conflict--with the world as a 
whole and the others of the world. Furthermore, what is a subject is not in fact constant: the 
variability of the relationships upon which I will argue, following Merleau-Ponty and Foucault, 
define the parameters of 'subjectivity' result in a variable subjectivity and thus, it seems, a variable 
freedom. In a sense, the subject thus understood is at once whole and bifurcated; subjectivity can 
thus be understood to be existence as an amalgam of interrelated, malleable, contingent and 
conflicting elements. 
Thus the subject who, as Foucault says, "we are invited to free" (DP, p. 30) must not be 
understood in terms of duality of mind and body, or subject and object: thus a subject does not at 
once instant resist power and in the next instant comply. Rather the subject--or subjectivity--is in 
tension. Merleau-Ponty understands subjectivity to be existence in a lived body; a form of being in 
which the 'subject' is both subject and object, mind and body, not as separate entities, but as 
moments of a single unit of being. The potentially free subject, I think, can be understood along 
similar lines. That is, we exist as a tension between construction and re-construction, domination 
and freedom. Following Foucault, the source of our 'true' domination lies in part within the reality 
which is our subjectivity; thus the source of our freedom must be in the 'self as well: including the 
knowing body as an element of self. In a sense, all the elements of our freedom or subjugation can 
be seen as existing within us--not as universal, essential attributes, but as factors of our 
relationship with the world and with others. Thus it seems that to describe what features 
characterize subjectivity one can begin to describe the features of a possible freedom. Freedom is a 
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process which can be understood as originating in the moment at which is tension invades the 
~ ctive world of the subject (thus opening for the subject the possibility of resistance) and is 
grasped by the subject as a project of the self, and a possible project of politics. I will use, for the 
remainder of this paper, the ideas of a 'project of the self and a 'project of politics' involving the 
self in order to expand upon the notion of freedom I am attempting to bring to life here. 
B. More Foucault. .. And a small bit of Marx 
Foucault was attentive to notion of re-construction of subjectivity; in a sense, this notion 
can be seen as an element of his general philosophical project, at least in terms of its overall 
development 1 In this section I intend to look at an interview with Foucault on the third volume of 
the Histor_y of Sexuality. which was touched upon briefly in the second chapter. By doing this, it 
will be possible to develop an idea of how Foucault understood freedom and the re-construction of 
subjectivity in order to relate his project to the project of this essay. To do so, I will contrast the 
notion of freedom being developed in this chapter, Foucault's notion of freedom and the Marxist 
notion of the relation between the subject and the world, in the form of a particular mode of 
production, in order to further develop a sketch of a theory of freedom. 
For Foucault, the idea of "liberation" is problematic in that "there is the danger that it will 
refer back to the idea that there does exist a nature or a human foundation which ... found itself 
concealed, alienated or imprisoned in and by some repressive mechanism" (FF, p. 3). Foucault is 
9 by this conclusion to propose the necessity of a practice of freedom, with ethical dimensions, 
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in order to avoid the potentially illusory effects of attempting a "liberation" of something which 
does not exist. To understand freedom in terms of 'freeing' something not only ignores the 
constructed nature of our being--including notions of false consciousness, alienation, etc.--through 
the existence of power relations, it opens the subject up to new relations of power which Foucault 
saw as unfreedoms. 
A good example of thought which articulates a liberating mechanism in the relationship 
between a subject and a particular form of world can be seen in Marxism. According to Marx, the 





interaction of the subject with the world--in the form of the mode of production and the 
superstructural features of the world which arise from it-- engenders a subject who comes to view 
his or her own existence and freedom as being dependent on a certain form of liberation or freedom 
from alienation; for example: communism. Coupled with the subject's own development--or even 
reconstitution through the development of a non-alienated subjectivity and 'true' consciousness 
leading to resistance and revolution--Marx saw within the world, in the form of economic 
processes and modes of production, a inevitable development by which world and subject are 
transformed in a dialectical interaction with each other. This dialectical interaction of subject and 
world furthers both (a) the development of a subject which can be free and (b) a world which 
facilitates the subject's freedom. The role of the proletarian worker in the capitalist mode of 
production, and the relations of production which it engendered, constituted the worker as that 
form of individual with the unique ability to see the inherent contradictions of capitalism, organize 
and bring about a successful communist revolution. 
Both Foucault and Marx saw the necessity of the alteration of the 'character' or 'nature' of 
the subject as being bound up in the possibility of freedom--Marx in terms of the development of 
class consciousness and the loss of alienation and Foucault in terms of the possible reconstruction 
of subjectivity. Marx, however, attempted to show 'scientifically' the necessity of the subject's 
development and the necessary liberating effects of that development for a particular form of 
subject: the proletarian. The worker or proletarian, furthermore, was possessed with a 
consciousness which could be freed, unlike the Foucaultian individual subject to (and the subject 
of) power relations: this is the fundamental core of foundationalism that Foucault is reacting 
against. Foucault saw y{subjugation in subjectivity, while Marx saw freedom in the realization of a 
'true' subjectivity. So it seems that we seem to have re-arrived at the dilemma. If one asserts with 
Foucault that there is nothing behind 'subjectivity' as it is lived as a reality by a subject
1
while at the 
same time asserting that this subjectivity is dominating in that it places the subject in a strategic 
relationship with forces of the world, from where arises the practice of freedom? 
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What Foucault was arguing against, I think, is subjectivity understood in terms of inherent 
possibility, as Marx argued for. I am arguing that there in nothing inherent within subjectivity 
which guarantees freedom, although I am arguing for the necessity of understanding how a subject 
is able to realize the possibility of a practice of freedom. That is, I am not asserting, for example, 
that the lived body or the reflective subject must be 'freed' from power relations in order for the 
subject to exist reflectively as a free subject. Rather, the lived body's insertion into a regime of 
power relations is precisely that aspect of subjectivity which provides a tension within the thinking 
existence of the reflective subject which allows for a practice of freedom to be developed 
Furthermore, to understand the lived body as Merleau-Ponty does is to see in the lived body an 
interplay of forces: 'natural' or biological and cultural. Thus the lived body is not the instinctual 
body or 'natural' body. As such, the constancy of the lived body must be understood as a constant 
relationship, rather than a constant result or constant cause. 
Foucault denies the viability of methods or systems of thought--existentialist and 
phenomenological thought in particular--which takes as an object of inquiry a theory of the subject 
and develops conclusions, including conclusions about freedom, from that theory (FF, p. 10). Is 
that not, however, pretty much what I have attempted to do, using as a foundation Merleau-Ponty 
and Foucault himself! Maybe, but I think--and I will explain this in more detail below--the 
approach to the problem suggested by Merleau-Ponty avoids the pitfalls Foucault claims to be 
inherent in "foundationalist' thinking. The following is Foucault's self-proclaimed intention: 
"What I wanted to know was how the subject constituted himself ... through a certain number of 
practices which were games of truth, applications of power, etc." (FF, p. 10). Foucault now 
claims to be interested in how the individual "constitutes himself in an active fashion" and not in 
how the individual plays a role in the forces which constitute him or her as a subject (FF, p. 11). 
· 1Thus Foucault asserts the necessity of understanding how a subject becomes the author or his or 
her own individuality or subjectivity (albeit not a purely autonomous author). 
However, as I mentioned above, what is problematic about Foucault, and which ironically 





understands it--including the self-constitution of subjectivity--is in itself subjugating or 
dominating. Furthermore, the subject is strategically implicated in a certain regime of overt power 
relations; ~ subject as an object of knowledge is ~ d into a subjugated position as part of a 
; tactic. To understand freedom as a process of reconstruction of self, or what Foucault specifically 
understands to be a process of "care of the self' as part of a "ontological condition of ethics," 
requires in my mind a relational theory of the subject in which the subjectivity of any given 
individual subject to power is put into tension by another aspect of subjectivity. The mechanisms 
and relationships which define a field of power relations in the external world are recreated in the 
individual as a 'subjectivity' and thus the process of freedom, it seems, must begin within the self. 
This tension can be seen, in a sense, as self conflict: the conflict within a subject who sees his or 
her very subjectivity as implicated in his or her own oppression or the oppression of others. 
Without this tension, there is no possibility of a "care of self' or any alternative vision of a 
process of freedom, because there is nothing within the constituted subject, since the subject's 
subjugating constitution stems from the subject's own role as a vector of power relations, which 
would necessitate or even make possible the beginning of a project which might be called, among 
other things, "care of the self." Furthermore, the external field of power relations, which defines 
for the individual the parameters of his or her subjectivity, is strategic as Foucault argues in 
Discipline and Punish and as I have attempted to illustrate in Chapter 2 of this essay. That is, it is 
strategic in that subjectivity is subjugating precisely in its conformity to the particular economic, 
political and social uses of individuals. As I argued in earlier in this essay, the 'political' character 
of power relations reflects the variety of individuality and subjectivity present in the world--
capitalism requires both worker and owner; sexism requires men who understand themselves in a 
specific manner in relation to women, and women who understand themselves in a specific manner 
in relation to men. 2 Thus there is a variability operative here in the possible nature of the process of 
2 I am not arguing for an interpretation of sexism or capitalism which implicates the oppressed in their 
oppression as causal factor in their experience of domination. As I will argue later in this chapter, the 
institutionalization of domination refigures this relationship. The nece~sary point I am trying to ma/ik 
here, on the helpful suggestion of others who have read and will read this essay, is that there is a 




freedom, related to the variability of the specific social, political, cultural and economic institutions 
which pre-figure the development of power relations and the variability of how different 
individuals are implicated in these processes. 
In a sense, I am doing little but providing an extension of one aspect of Foucault's 
relational notion of power: I am giving a little more weight to the notion of the body as a lived body 
or a knowing body. I am arguing, following Merleau-Ponty, that the body cannot be understood in 
the manner Foucault theorizes the body in Discipline and Punish. This leads, it seems, to 
something which might be called a theory of subjectivity, although I think it is better understood as 
a theory of how the subject is constituted as. the result of a particular constellation of relationships 
___::.--
which allows the subject a possibility of re-constitution: fundamentally, a chance at agency. That 
is, I am not arguing with Marx, for example, that there is some objective or historical situation 
which must be realized in order for freedom and the subject to escape the boundaries of ideology. I 
am arguing, however, against Foucault in that I see something within existence which gives 
subjectivity some primordial weight; which denies, in a sense, the notion that the subject is only a 
fiction. 
The 'subject' thus understood can be seen as set of relational functions into which variables 
are placed and one of these variables is the subject's freedom. 3 In doing this, I think it is possible 
to see how, with Merleau-Ponty, a subject can be both "constituting and constituted" and ·"passive 
indicate, I think, that the 'ethical' nature of freedom described by Foucault does not define the 
dimensions of the process of freedom in itself; if a process of 'care of the self allows a particular subject 
leway in relation to the subjugation produced by constitution, then it falls into the realm of the process 
of freedom I am attempting to describe. The method by which freedom is furthered is not as specific as 
the result which makes it a process of freedom: the confrontation of the subjugating aspects of our selves 
. This should be understood in terms of self-understanding and in terms of how individuals relate to 
others and the cultural, political and economic institutions in which individuals are placed in variable 
relationships. 
3 The idea of the 'subject function' is found in Foucault's work as well, but it should be understood here in 
a different sense. I think Foucault understands the subject fuction to mean the subject who acts a vector 
for truths produced by particular discursive rules or regimes of power relations. What I am arguing is 
that the subject-or rather subjectivity itself-should be taken as a function: that is, the subject is not 
only the expression of relations outside of him/herself, but is internally these relations. At the same 
time subjectivity blends into the world, following Merleau-Ponty: "I am at once wholly inside myself 
and wholly outside myself." Thus the relationships which are originaly external to us become part of 
our subjectivity; as a tensional subjectivity, and a 'functional' subjectivity, these relations do not remain 
constant--this is what freedom is. 
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and active" while at the same time following Foucault's analysis of power relations. A function, it 
seems, is an interesting thing. It is at once set--in that a function particular equation with certain 
boundaries and limits--and variable, in that different values for the variables result in a different 
value for the function as a whole. Furthermore, the overall result of the function is the combined 
result of the relationship between each of the variables within the function and the transformations 
of the input through the work done on each variable within equation. 4 How does this relate to 
freedom? Have I wandered once again into the realm of nonsense and away from that which is real 
or political? 
If we understand the subject as a set of functions, each of which is dependent on particular 
relationships--such as the relationship between our phenomenal body and the world as field of 
disciplinary mechanism and power relations--then our freedom, in a sense, can be understood as 
the transformation of the equations: a transformation of the subject function. Thus the subject can 
also be conceived of as a set of functions implying another a possible function: freedom or non-
freedom. This is what I intended by asserting that our freedom is the grasping of the tension in our 
subjectivity and asserting it reflectively as a project of our-selves or of politics. This project is a 
one which aims at the restructuring of relationships in order realize freedom, or at least to realize a 
lessened degree of subjugation. To actively question and in~ stioning resist the subjugating 
nature of subjectivity is thus an element of freedom. Importantly, this places freedom in the realm 
of the reflective: it is neither primordial nor_ is it inherent within our existence as human beings. 
~ =--
There is nothing about human existence which one can free: the free individual must create himself 
or herself as a 'free' being. 
4 Mathematically, the difference between x and x-squared in a function, for example, transforms the 
result for the same value of x; in terms of this analogy, the relationship must be understood to be more 
complex. That is, each varaible should be understood as undergoing transformation as part of 
subjectivity. Thus the subject does not function as a conduit for anonymous rules of discourse-as Foucault, 
for example., argues in The Archeology of Knowledge--but rather within the subject the relationship 
between the subject, as a lived body and as a reflective thinker, and the world--the world as 
constituted by language, the existence of others, power relations, ect.--may potentially undergo 
transformation; this is an aspect of the potential agency of the subject as I understand subjectivity, 







I think this places freedom in an ambiguous relationship to the commonly employed 
categories of positive freedom--the freedom to be your own "master" or to realize some state as a 
process of subjective action--and negative freedom, or freedom from restraint.5 I mention this -----here for a reason: freedom as it is understood as a category of the political culture in a late-modern 
democracy (ours) can be understood to be a mixture of these two conceptions of freedom; that is, 
freedom in the United States, the freedom which I have criticized following Foucault and Marx, 
contains elements of both positive and negative freedom. For example, individuals in the United 
States have, ostensibly, some leeway in their interaction with the State. This negative freedom in 
turn facilitates a certain level of positive freedom: the freedom to make certain choices and take 
certain actions in the market, to sell low and buy high until we either realize the American dream or 
step of the toes of the State. 
The idea of positive freedom and the idea of negative freedom in a sense imply each other. 
Freedom from something is meaningless unless you do something with it and freedom to do 
something or realize a certain state at which one becomes free is meaningless unless there is a 
potential something which can keep you from that doing or realization~ e subtle difference which 
notion is favored in any conception of freedom. he 'freedom' of a subject who is both subject to 
restraints and able to act is in the lack of restraint, if freedom is understood negatively, and in the 
realization of some goal through the action itself, if freedom is understood positively. However, to 
understand freedom in these terms (positive or negative) implies an arena of action, as I. Berlin 
argues in his essay on liberty. That is, both ways of understanding any given idea of freedom 
imply that there a state of human existence in which a subject can be free--either free to act, or free 
from restraint; both ways of understanding freedom imply a notion of an autonomous subject--
who, even if restrained in the case of freedom understood positively, is free when he or she acts. 
Freedom understood 'positively' implies that to act of ones own will is freedom, while freedom 
understood negatively implies an autonomous subject which must be 'freed' from something. 
5 Eee Isiah Berlin "Two ideas of Freedom" in Four Essays on Liberty for a definitive development of 




I have proposed that freedom lies in the reflective grasping of the tension inherent within 
our subjectivity as a re-constitutive project of the self or politics. 6 This notion of freedom has 
certain affinities with the notion of positive freedom as explicated by Berlin, yet there are important 
differences as well. As I have argued so far, freedom must be understood as a process; thus this 
notion of freedom is in a sense positive in that freedom is found in the process of reconstruction 
and confrontation. However, Foucault's work leads one to conclude that there is no possible arena 
of freedom in which a subject can be free either in the positive sense or the negative sense. The ------
world's configuration is implicated in relations of power, as are the actions of the subjects in the 
world. To put it simply, there is no space within society in which we can act freely simply as a 
result of the character of that space and no state which we can reach, through any action, which 
woul~ e freedo~ in the act of reaching that state or actually being in that state.? We are 
never autonomous subjects, and thus although we can be free subjects the categories of positive 
and negative freedom seem to have lost some of their descriptive value. Our chance at freedom 
does not rest in our autonomy, which is illusory, but rather in the relations to which we are 
subject. 
I mention this for a couple of reasons. First, it brings the discussion back to first chapter, 
in which I proposed that freedom as it is understood in the context of late-modern capitalist 
democracy is in fact an u~freedoi:n (but for different reasons than those offered by, for example, 
Marx or his followers). That is, when an individual acts 'freely', his or her actions are implicated 
in the perpetuation of power relations which in fact work to constitute that individual, and others, 
as subjectivities and by doing so perpetuate subjugation. Thus our famous political freedoms are in 
fact simply act~d acts which potentially can lead to unfreedoms, for ourselves and others. This ---·--is not a universal truth about our politics; every voter does not re-enforce unfreedom through the 
6 This is both similar and different to Foucault's unformulated proposition that freedom 'is the 
ontological condition of ethics' and that freedom must be understood as a practice. It is different mainly 
in that I begun with an analysis which is not purely Foucaultian to arrive at a similar conclusion. Thus, 
although this is not 'Foucault's theory of freedom' there would be no sketch of a theory of freedom at 
all here if not for Foucault. 
7 See discussion of Foucault's idea of freedom in chapter 1 for more on this. 
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act of voting. However, I still hold these acts to be just acts, and only part of the practice/process 
of freedom when understood in the context of grasping and reflectively articulating a project of the 
tension of subjectivity. This brings the discussion around, I suppose, to a discussion of how 
freedom can be understood in terms of politics. To accomplish this, I will, once again, rely on 
notion developed by Foucault in the same late interview I have been discussing. 
However, before I proceed, I would like to make one distinction. Certainly there is a 
definite relation between the constitution or self-constitution of individuals and the larger 
institutional structures of domination which in a sense 'feed' on the individuals produced by 
specific regimes of power relations. Thus understood, the practice of freedom must be attentive to 
the relationship--and to the variability and difference inherent within that relationship in terms of 
the variable status of different individuals in relation to 'powerful' institutions--between the 
individual as he or she is constituted strategically in a particular political, economic and cultural 
context since within that context there exists powerful and.often oppressive institutions. In this 
sense, the process of freedom is dependent on the relationship between a subjugated individual and 
the institutional context in which that individual exists; freedom cannot rest only in the individual, 
because the subject is such--that is, actually a subject--in relation to powerful institutions and thus 
his or her subjugation cannot be only a question of internal battles or realizations .. 
However, I would like to propose that a significant portion of the process of freedom can 
in fact be individual. That is, I think that it is possible for an individual to engage in a process of 
freedom without direct recourse to ex licitly political acts. It seems possible that an individual 
subject can in fact be free on his or her own terms; if this possibility seems unfounded in practice 
or in the context of the argument of this essay, maybe it is true that an individual can attempt, at 
least, practice of freedom within the confines of his or her own particular world and self. I argued 
previously that the process of freedom involved, in some ways, a process of self-confrontation and 
self-realization. It is in this sense that individuals can be free as individuals; it is in this sense that 
the self can be understood as one of the 'spaces' of freedom (and probably the only 'space' of 
freedom). This idea, of course, is subject to critique: those individuals who are most subjugated as 
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a result of their specific economic, social and cultural situation exist in a relationship with powerful 
institutions which denies them any possibility of such a practice because their lives are determined 
not by self-introspection or self-responsibility, but by the necessities of survival. This, however, 
does not make the idea of an individual process of freedom impossible, it only makes it 
problematic and difficult 
C. Politics and Freedom 
How, one might ask, do the subterranean relations of power relate to larger institutional 
structures? Furthermore, how can our freedom be understood both in terms of those large 
structures and in terms of a project of the self? Foucault would have us understand this relationship 
in terms of the congealment of power relations or the blocking of necessary tension: 
This analysis of relations of power constitutes a very complex field; it sometimes 
meets what we can in fact call states of domination, in which the relations of power, 
instead of being variable ... find themselves firmly set and congealed. When an 
individual or a social group manages to block a field of relations of power ... we 
are then facing a state of domination (FF, p. 3). 
In this we can see something of how a society comes to be normalizing. A certain form of 
~ ' 
subjectivity--a self based on race or sex, for example--comes to be i~_stitutio~~~f?~ ~s aberrant, or 
a least as existing outside of a norm. The subject in question--the deviant, the abnormal--
understands him or herself as being a certain form of subject as a result of that subject's existence 
in a certain regime of power relations and must also face these power relations in the form of 
coercive institutions: the State, a dominant race or class, etc. These relations are not obvious; yet 
they are evident enough in that one can see, in the world, ways in which certain forms of 
subjectivity are related to norms or conventions which, for the subject, are unfreedoms: racism or 
sexism are examples of this 'reality'. One can also see, on this level, how different individuals 
(depending on their economic or cultural place in society, for example) can be more subjugated 
than others; or, how different individuals have a greater or lesser chance to engage in a practice of 
freedom. The freedom of the individual to reconstitute him or herself thus faces a further 
problematic, and at this level the project of the individual on the self must become political. 
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In Discipline and Punish, Foucault gives a nineteenth century example of a confrontation 
between a discourse of illegality, in the form of a young vagabond, and the discourse of discipline, 
in the form of a judge, who is this example personifies the character of law and discipline. 
According to Foucault "all the illegalities that the court defined as offenses the accused 
reformulated as the affirmation of a living force" (DP, p. 290). An account of the trial was 
published in a newspaper, which chronicles the interaction which talces place between the judge 
and the accused; which Foucault argues captures the conflict between discourses representing 
opposing modalities of life. The judge's questions and the responses of the accused do not 
connect: it is as if they were spoken in a different language. When the judge instructs the boy that 
he should be at home, the boy respond "Have I got a home?'' and so on (DP, p. 290). The subject, 
the accused, according to Foucault, understands the language of discipline on his own terms; "The 
lack of a home as vagabondage, the lack of a master as independence, the lack of work as freedom, 
the lack of a time-table as the fullness of days and nights" (DP, p. 290). 
I am not asserting that this example shows that to be free one must throw the norms of 
society out the window with the VISA; that is, I am not arguing that every social convention or 
norm is an unfreedom. Rather, this example can be understood in the context of the project of this 
essay; that is, the subject in question has grasped the tension existing within himself as a subject 
and taken this as a project of life. It also shows, interestingly, the barriers, the walls, raised to this 
project by the "congealed" forms of power relations. The accused was sentenced to two years in a 
reform house and his sentence "no doubt long placed [him] in the circuits of delinquency" (DP, p. 
290). In a sense, this subject was engaged in a practice of freedom, as freedom is understood in 
this essay, because he had managed for a moment to slip free of the mechanisms of discipline. This 
example also shows the processional nature of freedom, in that in articulating a project of the self 
against the institutions by which power relation are furthered effectively re-inserted this 
'delinquent' into the circuits of discipline. This could have the effect of nullifying the project of e 
individual or, on the other hand, re-enforcing the possibility of an articulated project of the self in 
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that the conditions which I have argued engender this project, potentially, have been re-created for 
this subject; he was put, so to speak, back into the machine. 
A politics of freedom, then, can be understood as '1.11 effort on the part of individuals or 
groups to-!£_tively confront the institutional structures into which relations of power have congealed 
(a process, I would argue, which must be coupled with a confrontation of the effects of the 
/ 
relations of power within the soul of the individual). These institutions or forces cannot, however, 
be understood as power relations in a different fonn; a more solid f onn, for example. 
'Congealment' must be understood relationally, as power must be understood relationally. This 
dual project of re-constitution of self and confrontation of the structures and fonns of power 
relations in society cannot but reorient the subject toward the world. That is, if this is understood 
as a project of a subject in and towards the world, the interaction which follows (as I attempted to 
show in the previous chapter) potentially re-asserts or re-creates the tension which I have argued 
represents the original potential of a subject to engage in a practice of freedom. Thus freedom can 
be understood to be both a practice (which involves the reflective action of a subject) and a process 
(which does not) because the practice of freedom in a sense furthers the potential of freedom by 
recreating or altering the subject's role in the relationships which characterize both resistance and 
power. 
How can I translate this abstract formulation into something more 
useful? That is, what meaning does a "grasping" of a "tension in subjectivity" and articulating it 
as a project of politics have to with everyday acts, like voting or buying groceries? I am not 
asserting that this project need necessarily be understood precisely as that by the acting subject in 
the tenns I have used. For example, a woman who votes for a politician who supports a particular 
law which recognizes as part of the possibility of being a woman the right to detennine the use of 
her own body can be said, I think, to be somewhat engaged in a practice of freedom. Why? 
Because in doing so I would argue that woman has made some sort of effort to reconstitute how 
women are understood as women as well as making a practical move to change some of the 




part of being a woman a lack of control over ones body. The actuality of voting does not add to the 
practice of freedom--the relation between the act and the subject as a soul whose constitution is 
subjugating does. An analysis along similar lines could be provided in relation to a man's vote on 
the same issue, although his vote would have as its object the reconfiguration of how a man 
understands himself in relation to women. I would argue that numerous examples can be found, of 
widely varying sorts, which illustrate the possibility and character of a process of freedom in a 
similar manner and a manner which does not limit the process to action traditionally thought of as 
political, such as voting. The problem of the 'free' act, however, must be thought of in terms of 
degree. 
No act or choice can be seen as being a 'free' act or a 'free' choice, because freedom lies 
not in the specific act, but in the way that act is related to the subject in terms of the subject as a 
subjugated individual; subjugated by the very quality of his or her subjectivity, of his or her soul: 
in every act, one can see something of a practice of freedom and something of discipline. There is \ 
no point in an individual's life at which her of she can sit down and say "Now I can rest, because I 
I 
am free." However, an individual can engage in a practice of freedom or participate in a process (or 
politics) of freedom. I argued above that our acts and choices as they are manifested in the politics 
of a late-modem capitalist democracy and understood in this context as elements of our freedom are 
in fact not freedoms. This argument leaves one with many unanswered questions, however. For 
example, how can one conceive of authority or responsibility in these terms? It seems that at this 
point number of problematics have arisen: the 'act' in terms of its relation to freedom; the lack of 
any notion of responsibility or obligation; and the lack of a notion of authority or legitimacy. The 
elucidation of these problems is beyond the scope of this paper. However would at least like to 
point out the direction an analysis of these problems, following the arguments in this paper, might 
proceed; I will employ the problem of authority as a means to this end. 
D. Authority 
Foucault's analysis of the link between power and knowledge leaves us with an incomplete 
ability to know; our knowledges, including self knowledge or self-understanding, are implicated in 
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relations of power. I have already argued as to why a subject is able to resist this subterranean 
linkage of power and knowledge and thus possibly engage in a practice of freedom. Nonetheless, 
any knowledges we have of our constitution will be incomplete and thus freedom must be thought 
of as a practice of understanding and re-understanding: a reflective dialectic, in a sense. How are 
we to question or accept authority then, if our knowledge of our subjugation is incomplete and 
L 
provisional? If we can never have access to 'true' knowledge of the validity of the authority we 
submit to--in terms of its relation to the potential practice of freedom or in terms of analyzing the 
authority of the State or a specific government--then at what point are we to reject certain forms of 
authority and be 'right' or justified in doing so? 
I would argue that these problems can be pursued in a manner which is attentive both to 
the actuality of construction and subjugation and the possibility of reconstruction and freedom. In a 
sense, authority, legitimacy, and obligation can be seen as fundamentally linked to the practice of 
freedom; in articulating a practice of freedom which is a project of self and politics, individuals can 
develop provisional knowledges of the validity of authority congealed into particular forms of 
' 
institutions or cultural norms. Simply put, a practice of freedom necessitates a concurrent practice 
which evaluates the validity of authority; they are like two sides of a coin or the two "leaves" of 
being. Furthermore, following Foucault, authority ( or discipline) becomes ingrained within us: it is 
part of our constitution as subjects. It is 'valid' in that is has the effect of constraining our actions. 
Thus in "testing the limits of our constitution" individuals can test the limits of authority and the 
legitimacy of the institutions and norms with which they are placed in strategic conjunction by the 
relations of power. This, of course, does not explain away the problem of authority; it does, 
however, indicate a possible way, related to the notion of freedom argued for in this essay, of 
looking at the problem of authority . 
How does this relate to our politics? In the course of their lives, most people submit to 
authority in some form or another. When I turn this thesis in on April 30, 1993 I will have 
submitted to the authority of Oberlin College and the Department of Politics. Is this not of my own 
choosing? When I obey a law, do I obey out of fear of punishment, respect for the law, or do I 
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obey because from childhood I have been trained to think that obeying the law was a normal, just, 
and right practice? These questions seem at this point to be unanswerable. Every society requires 
some sort of cohesion in order for any form of politics to exist at all; it is utopian, it seem, to argue 
that the only valid authority must come from the self alone, even a self engaged in a practice of 
reconstitution of self, a practice of freedom. What the above analysis leads to, however, is the 
notion that authority retains validity until that authority, or the legitimacy of a State, is exposed as 
<--
subjugating. Concepts of authority or legitimacy (or responsibility and obligation)--both in terms 
of practice or politics and in terms of the applicability of these concepts to the discourse of political 
theory as a whole--are threatened by theories of power relations, historical construction, and 
contingency. I have attempted in this essay address this problematic for the specific case of 
freedom. It seems to me, however, that one can look again at concepts (of authority, legitimacy 
etc.) and attempt to articulate the possible meanings they might have in light of the changes, both 
politically and theoretically, in the development of society. 
E. Conclusion 
I have argued that the play of relationships which engender a subject creates within that 
subject the possibility of a tension between what is known and understood as normal (and which is ----
subjugating) and what is possible (and which is, as a result, potentially freeing). The realization of 
this tension in the reflective reality of the subject provides for the subject a possibility of resistance 
to the subjugation which is ingrained in his or her subjectivity as a result of the particular field of 
power relations to which the individual is subject. Resistance, in tum, can be articulated by the 
subject as a practice or process of freedom, in which this tension is grasped by the subject and 
taken as a project of the self and a project of politics. This process, I have argued, contains the 
potential freedom of the subject. Importantly, there is nothing which can guarantees this freedom 
except for the practice itself; as a result, and as a result of the subjects inability to extract him or 
herself from the world and thus from power relations, the subject can not reach a~ of freedom. 




contains some practices of freedom and some unfreedom. As I mentioned above, this analysis has 
left open many questions while it has attempted to answer only one. 
The entire discussion of this essay is pre-supposed by the assumption--it can only be an 
assumption--that there is no eternal or universal aspect to subjectivity which can be freed and no 
eternal or universal world or institution which can create the conditions of freedom in itself. Thus 
what constitutes freedom should be understood as being contingent upon the particular historical 
situation, and the multiplicity of subjectivities which exist in any such situation, in which a subject 
engages in a practice of freedom. Freedom understood historically does not require an analysis of 
comparative freedom now and then. Rather I would argue that the meaning of freedom, as a 
practice of self, undergoes historical flux; furthermore it is variable within any given moment of -- ~--
history. Thus one would say not that we are more or less free now than in the nineteenth century, 
but that the meaning of freedom today and what constitutes a practice (the actual character of the 
practice) of freedom at this point in history has changed as the relations of power and the world in 
which a subject exists, and which a subject can understand him/herself in terms of, have changed. 
The particular problem with the conception of freedom which organizes the politics of late-
modem capitalist democracies, like the United State , is that freedom is understood to have the 
same meaning for each individu~ I am as free as the next person: our freedom, despite the actual 
difference in situation and difference in how I understand myself in relation to another's self 
understanding and in relation to the understanding we have of each other, is taken by the State as 
equivalent. Difference, however, is subjectivity: there can be no possible equivalence, only 
relation, in the soul of different individuals unless the life trajectory of two individuals is precisely 
the same (which is absurd). Freedom, therefore, must be understood to have variable meaning at 
this moment of history. What constitutes the reflective grasping of the tension in subjectivity and 
the subsequent articulation of this tension into a project of reconstitution of the self or of politics 
must be understood as variable even at the individual level. The problem of difference, it seems, 
<:-----:= 






between difference and freedom constitutes a whole set of new problems; problems which must be 
addressed if freedom is to have a practical meaning which is in some sense 'liberating'. 
In my mind, the most pressing question which this essay leaves one with is the possibility 
of the institutionalization of freedom into politics; that is, the possibility of creating spaces in 
society which are at once spaces of politics and spaces of freedom. Nietzsche argued that one must 
be able to look from down from the heights onto the world and its masses and conventions in order 
to understand how society and culture has become ingrained, in his opinion with negative results, 
into a individual's being. The re-creation of oneself as the overman necessitated a mountain top, 
clean air, the view down into the valley: all metaphors, I think, for space or distance between what 
constrains--life-denying morality and values for Nietzsche--the self. It was the space and the 
distance from the cultural norms of society--the good and evil of a decadent age--which allowed for 
the subject to become free. I have argued, following Foucault, that essentially these spaces cannot 
be found in the world: there is no space into which power relations have not crawled, including the 
----space of the subject itself. However, it seems that freedom, if it is to be more than a perpetual 
struggle, requires these spaces. I have argued in this essay that the practice of freedom requires a 
re-constitution of self. It is possible, I think, to see in this reconstitution the possibility of first 
creating a space of freedom within the subject, a free soul or spirit. From there, an analysis might 
look at the possibility of creating these spaces within the world. 
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